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1、 大学毕业设计（论文）外文翻译题 目： 转型国家的银行民营化效率 学 院： 经济与管理学院 专 业： 金融学 班 级： 姓 名： 指导教师： 201* 年 6 月*大学学士学位论文外文翻译Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition CountriesAuthor: Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P.c1. Introduction A construct Banking sectors in the transition economies of Central and Southeaste
2、rn Europe were restructured dramatically the 1990s.Beginning with a financial organization that, in most cases, was designed to support the central planning apparatus, new governments moved to create modern commercial banking sectors immediately. The first rudimentary step was to divest commercial a
3、nd retail activities from the portfolios of national banks and to set up new joint-stock banks with universal licenses that were fully state-owned initially. Bank privatization was an essential part of the financial reform agendas in these countries. Although much descriptive work exists on these fi
4、nancial sector reforms and bank privatizations, e.g., Bonin, Mizsei, Szkely, and Wachtel (1998), no systematic empirical work was possible until sufficient time had elapsed to make the construction of a meaningful dataset possible. The basic issue to investigate is whether or not privatization impro
5、ves bank performance. Although the theoretical literature indicates that private firms should outperform government-owned firms, empirical evidence is needed to confirm this theoretical hypothesis for banks in transition countries.The empirical literature provides evidence of the influence of owners
6、hip on the performance of individual banks and on the effectiveness of the banking sector. In a cross-country study, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the performance of government-owned banks is inferior to that of private banks. Claessens, Demirgc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) i
7、nvestigate performance differences between domestic and foreign banks in eighty countries, both developed and developing, over an eight-year period from 1988 to 1995. These authors find that foreign bank entry was followed by a reduction in both the profitability and the overhead expenses of domesti
8、c banks and that foreign banks in developing countries perform better than do domestic banks. For Latin American countries, Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) argue that foreign bank entry is associated with improved production of financial services and more banking competition; in addition, they c
9、laim that it facilitates the early waves of privatization ofgovernment-owned domestic banks. Hence, this empirical literature provides evidence that ownership matters; in particular, government ownership of banks is less efficient than private ownership and foreign bank entry has a salutary effect o
10、n banking sectors.Much of the empirical literature on banking in transition countries addresses the impact of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency. Hasan and Marton (2003), Drakos (2003), and Fries and Taci (2003) demonstrate that the entry of more efficient foreign banks creates an environment
11、that forces the entire banking system to become more efficient, both directly and indirectly, in transition countries. Buch (2000) compares interest rate spreads in the three fast-track transition countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, from 1995 to 1999. She finds evidence confirming the
12、 hypothesis that foreign banks create a more competitive market environment in transition economies, but only after they have attained sufficient aggregate market share. A few studies examine the effects of ownership on individual bank efficiency. For Poland, Nikiel and Opiela (2002) find that forei
13、gn banks servicing foreign and business customers are more cost-efficient but less profit-efficient than other banks in Poland. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2003) examine the performance of banks in eleven transition countries and show that majority foreign ownership is associated with improved bank e
14、fficiency. However, these authors cannot investigate privatization directly because their data do not distinguish among different types of foreign bank ownership. Studies focusing specifically on the effects of bank privatization are less numerous. Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (2000) document marg
15、inal performance improvements and increases in equity among privatized banks in OECD countries. For Argentina, Clark and Cull (1999, 2000) study the privatization process and show that the success of the provincial bank privatization depended on the effectiveness of the buyers. These authors find ev
16、idence that credit allocation and efficiency are higher in privatized banks. The transformation of the Argentine banking system occurred mainly through domestic mergers and acquisitions so that foreign banks played only a relatively minor role. In the transition countries, the prevalence of foreign
17、strategic owners in formerly state-owned but subsequently privatized banks makes it crucial to distinguish these banks from foreign Greenfield banks when analyzing bank privatization. In this paper, we focus on six relatively advanced transition countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croat
18、ia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We chose not to include banks in very small transition economies, e.g., the Baltic countries and Slovenia, and those in less advanced transition economies that have only recently restructured the banking system, e.g., the former Soviet Union, Albania and the other Ba
19、lkan states. In the next section, we present a brief description of the privatization experiences in these six countries to establish that the strategies and the timing of privatizations are sufficiently different to allow us to use these experiences as the basis for an empirical analysis of privati
20、zation. Section 3 describes our dataset and presents the results of testing for differences in means across bank types for several measures of bank performance and for several bank characteristics. Section 4 characterizes briefly our methodology of deriving profit and cost efficiency measures from s
21、tochastic frontier estimates that allow for country and year effects directly in a pooled data set. In this section, we relate the bank efficiency scores, as well as a measure of financial performance, to the type of ownership and the method of privatization in second-stage regressions. Section 5 co
22、ncludes with a brief summary focusing on policy implications. 2. Bank Privatization in Six Transition Economies Pre-transition banking sectors were designed to meet the needs of a centrally planned economy(CPE).Intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized within the state banking app
23、aratus basically through a system of directed credits to state-owned enterprises for both investment needs and budget allocations for the working capital necessary to meet the output plan. In most CPEs, large specialty banks performed specific functions. A state savings bank, with an extensive branc
24、h network, collected virtually all household deposits. A foreign trade bank handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An agricultural bank provided short-term financing to the agricultural sector. on bank funded long-term capital projects and infrastructure development.Hence,banking activ
25、ities were both subservient to the plan and segmented along functional lines in CPEs. In the transition economies (TEs), the first step in banking sector reform involved creating a two-tier system with commercial banking activities carved out of the old central bank. At the beginning of the decade,
26、the new banking sectors in the former CPEs consisted of the newly created commercial banks and the specialty banks, both types having universal banking licenses, along with a few foreign Greenfield banks and often many relatively undercapitalized Renovo domestic private banks that were born under la
27、x entry requirements.Specialty banks had virtual monopolies in their core activities, e.g., the savings bank was often the only entity with an extensive enough branch network throughout the country to collect primary deposits. Typically, three or four large banks dominated the emerging banking secto
28、r in a TE. Both the newly created commercial entities and the specialty banks were state-owned initially. Hence, structural segmentation, a proliferation of weak small domestic private banks, and state-ownership of the large banks were the major features of banking sectors in TEs at the beginning of
29、 the 1990s.These legacies affected the banking sectors in all of the countries in our sample with the exception of Croatia, which was part of Yugoslavia. From the 1950s, commercial banks in Croatia as well as the other republics were not state-owned but were owned collectively according to the Yugos
30、lavian system of self-management. Virtually all foreign exchange deposits collected by the republic-level banks were remitted to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in exchange for credits in dinars. Upon succession in June 1991, the Yugoslavian government froze the foreign exchange deposits
31、 of Croatian banks. Hence, Croatian banks faced a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities creating large holes in their balance sheets after succession. At the end of 1995, four Croatian banks were selected for government rehabilitation because of the poor quality of their loan portfolios.
32、Involvement in this program resulted in these banks being nationalized so that four large state-owned banks were created in Croatia in the middle of the 1990s. The three more advanced TEs, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, embarked on significantly different bank privatizations programs dur
33、ing the first half of the 1990s. Even before the political change, the Hungarian government had been receptive to foreign bank activity as it allowed three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985. By the end of 1994, the Hungarian foreign trade bank had been purchased by a foreign owner an
34、d foreign investors held about 20% of total banking assets in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, three of the largest four banks participated in the first wave of voucher privatization in 1992. Both of the southeastern TEs,i.e., Bulgaria and Romania, began bank privatization only in the late In 2000, f
35、oreign investors owned less than half of Romanian banking assets and two of the three largest banks remained state-owned as late as 2003. Beginning in 1995 with virtually no Although the Czech government In Croatia, only one small foreign bank was operating in 1995 and there was hardly any foreign o
36、wnership of With some inducement from the G7 donor countries and international financial institutions, Polish authorities set a three Investment funds, the largest of which were created by these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program. Hence, this initial divestiture
37、of state holdings resulted in interlocking ownership with the state retaining large controlling stakes of voucher-privatized Czech banks. At the end of 1994, although foreign investors held about 6% of banking assets in the Czech Republic, none of the large banks had any foreign ownership. -year tim
38、etable at the beginning of 1993 for privatizing the nine medium-sized, regional, state-owned banks that were created from the commercial portfolio of the national bank. However, by the end of 1994, only two of these banks had been privatized and only two more would be privatized before 1997. Foreign
39、 ownership of banking assets remained insignificant in Poland at about 2% in the mid-1990s.Macroeconomic instability and financial sector distress made bank privatization infeasible in Bulgaria and Romania during the first half of the 1990s. By 1995, neither Bulgaria nor Romania had privatized any b
40、anks and foreign ownership of banking assets was negligible at less than 1% in both countries. banking assets. Of the six countries, only Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland had committed to selling banks to foreign investors by the end of the first half of the 1990s.However, by the end the decade
41、, five of the six countries were embarked on, or had completed, privatizations that would put at least 75% of their banking assets under foreign control by 2002. The second half of the 1990s witnessed a flurry of bank privatizations in these countries. Appendix A lists the banks in our sample from e
42、ach country ranked according to market share at the end of the decade. Information on each banks status throughout the 1990s is provided and, when relevant, the banks privatization is dated. Bank privatization proceeded relatively swiftly in Hungary; by mid-1997, eight of the top ten banks were majo
43、rity foreign-owned. After a few initial bank privatizations, the Polish government became sidetracked by a bank consolidation initiative that was intended to fend off foreign competition. Nonetheless, a combination of mergers and privatizations involving foreign partners left foreigner investors hol
44、ding more than 75% of Polish banking assets by 2000. t was late to recognize the importance of attracting strategic foreign investors for its large voucher-privatized banks, all major banks were sold to foreign owners by mid-2001. 1990s.After instituting a currency board and stabilizing the macroeco
45、nomic environment, the Bulgarian government privatized its first bank to a consortium of investors in 1997.By the end of 2000, eight of the ten largest banks in Bulgaria were foreign owned. Romania is a laggard in bank privatization compared to the other former CPEs. holdings in Croatia, foreigner i
46、nvestors had acquired about 84% of banking assets by 2000 and, by 2002, all of the ten largest banks in the country were majority foreign owned. In summary, Hungary was the first country to shed the legacies of the CPE by privatizing all but one of its major banks by mid-1997. In Poland, after some
47、delay in the privatization timetable, only the zloty savings bank and the umbrella agricultural bank remain state-controlled. Initially, the Czech Republic placed three big banks in the voucher privatization program but, despite a late start, foreign investors gained control of all large Czech banks
48、 by mid-2001. The banking sectors in Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia were financially distressed in the first half of the 1990s, albeit for different reasons, so that bank privatization could not begin until the late 1990s. Once started, sales of banks to foreign investors were rapid in Bulgaria and Croatia. Romania is the only one of the six transition countries in this study to retain significant government ownership in its banking sector through 2003 with only one of its three largest banks privatized.转型国家的银行民营化效率作者：约翰博宁;伊夫特哈尔哈桑;保罗沃赫特尔1 引言上世纪90年代，中欧和东南欧转型经济体国家对银行