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1、人民币汇率弹性增强对美国的影响来源：福布斯，2010.06.24，作者：Rachel Ziemba，Natalia Gurushina，Arnab Das提要：近日中国人民银行决定进一步推进人民币汇率形成机制改革，增强人民币汇率弹性。中国央行可能会采取2008年中期之前实施的参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度，这不仅有助于中国更好地管理物价压力和资产市场，也将推动美国乃至全球经济的再平衡进程。如果人民币兑欧元和美元汇率大幅升值，而中国没有其他政策来刺激国内消费，将导致全球经济增速趋缓以及通胀率攀升。中国汇率政策对美国国债市场的提振作用将会增强。 （外脑精华北京）在今年4月份编撰的最新
2、一期中国季度经济预测报告中，我们曾经预期中国将于今年中期开始允许人民币对美元汇率升值。而中国政府宣布这项决定的时间比我们预期的时间早了两个星期。人民币将渐进升值 当前我们所要研究的问题是人民币汇率弹性增强将意味着什么。我们得出的总体结论是汇率弹性增强将有助于中国更好地管理物价压力和资产市场，但所有举措都可能遵照循序渐进的原则。中国选择此时宣布进行汇改可能同20国集团峰会临近有关，而且一些分析人士声称这是一项明智之举，此举可使代表们在全球经济失衡问题研讨会上将关注力从中国转向美国。我们预期中国将把明年人民币兑美元名义汇率同比涨幅限制在不超过4%的适度水平。而我们预期即便中国央行将采取渐进主义和谨
3、慎的立场，我们预计全球市场（尤其是风险资产和豪赌人民币汇率升值的热钱，特别是亚洲新兴市场）在短期内将对中国汇改做出积极回应。即便是渐进式汇改，外汇弹性增强不仅将促进人民币兑美、欧、日货币汇率进一步升值，也将有助于推动其他国家的外部调整，尤其是向中国提供半成品、大宗商品和一些消费品的亚洲新兴市场。但是中国的行动（而非声明）将决定人民币汇率弹性增强能否引发全球总体需求产生变化。由于美国金融危机加剧以及美元急剧贬值，中国在2008年中期重新实施紧盯美元汇率机制，外界普遍预期中国放弃实行了近两年的紧盯美元汇率机制是实施危机管理退出战略的一步。不过，许多市场参与者预期欧元兑美元汇率的大幅贬值将使中国允许
4、人民币升值的时间至少将被推延至7月。具体采取何种汇率机制尚不清楚，但中国央行看来可能会重拾2005年中期至2008年中期采取的允许汇率在一定区间内浮动的一篮子货币汇率机制。增强人民币汇率弹性有利于中国和全球经济调整 除来自即将举行的20国集团峰会的政治压力，调整汇率机制可能是基于包括中国在内的贸易顺差国家急需刺激内需。鉴于贸易逆差国家经济正在下滑，这种调整是让全球经济恢复平衡和可持续增长的必要之举。不过，我们需要指出的是人民币汇率弹性的增强，尤其是如果具有透明度低或是不确定的特点，将给人民币兑一篮子内主要货币即时汇率的双向浮动提供更大空间。这种不确定性将使中国央行在管理人民币实际有效汇率方面获
5、得更大自主权，虽然可能需要付出货币政策自主权减弱的代价。长期影响可能将是人民币兑美元汇率最终会出现一种似是而非的贬值，这将有助于填补近期欧元狂贬造成的竞争力损失。毕竟，欧元区是中国最大出口市场。增强人民币汇率弹性对中国经济和全球经济调整而言都是必要的。经济高速增长的中国比经济低迷的美国更需要收紧货币政策，美国仍需通过货币刺激来提振经济。引入美国货币政策制约了中国刺激内需的手段，迫使中国反而去依靠收紧流动性来迫使企业通过其他渠道融资来扩大生产和减少通胀压力。中国私人消费呈持续复苏态势，但允许人民币升值以及人民币升值提升中国购买力是确保中国和全球经济增长的一个先决条件。更显重要的是通过收紧贷款政策
6、以及逐步上调利率等审慎的宏观调控举措来降低中国居民储蓄流入企业的规模。即便中国当局同意人民币兑美元汇率进行双向浮动来减少投机行为，中国政策将对美国国债市场、大宗商品和风险资产的提振作用将会增强，尤其是如果其他新兴市场国家从中受到启发，并且只允许汇率缓步贬值。如果人民币兑欧元和美元汇率大幅升值，而没有其他政策来刺激中国消费，将导致全球经济增速趋缓以及通胀率攀升，因为中国商品价格的上涨成本将被转嫁至10集团消费者身上。中国劳动力成本已经重回2007年和2008年开始的上涨轨道，而劳动人口水平、劳动力频繁流动和罢工活动、以及农村发展政策均表明劳动力成本将继续攀升。这个世界未来发展趋势将是众多国家争夺
7、越来越小的市场份额，从而增添风险资产上行压力。英文原文：Flexible Yuans Impact On The U.S.Back in April, when we were piecing together our last quarterly outlook on China, we projected that China would begin to allow the renminbi to appreciate against the U.S. dollar around mid-year. The announcement in Beijing, then, came abou
8、t two weeks ahead of schedule. We wont complain!Now we are left with the question of what the more flexible renminbi will mean going forward. Our general takeaway is that the increase in flexibility could help China manage price pressures and asset markets better, but any moves are likely to be grad
9、ual. It seems likely that the approach of the G-20 meetings had something to do with Beijings timing-and some analysts have called it a clever stroke that is likely to shift attention away from China and toward the U.S. as delegates at the summit discuss global economic imbalances.We expect China to
10、 allow a modest and nominal appreciation against the USD of no more than 4% on an annual basis in the next year. Yet even though we expect gradualism and caution from the PBoC, we predict global markets-and particularly risk assets and proxies for China revaluation, especially in Emerging Market Asi
11、a-will react positively to the move in the short-term.Even if gradual, FX flexibility should not only facilitate more appreciation of the RMB against G-3 currencies, but also aid in the external adjustment of other countries-especially those in EM Asia that supply China with both intermediate goods,
12、 commodities and some consumption goods. But Chinas actions-not its announcement-will determine whether the increasing flexibility adds to or subtracts global aggregate demand.A change away from the almost-two-year-old U.S. dollar peg, implemented in mid-2008 as the U.S. financial crisis intensified
13、 and the dollar fell sharply, was widely expected as part of Chinas exit strategy from crisis management. However, many market participants expected that the euros sharp fall against the dollar would delay a Chinese revaluation at least until July. The specifics remain uncertain, but the PBoC seems
14、likely to return to the multi-currency basket, within a band, with a crawling peg regime of the type that prevailed from mid-2005 to mid-08 （the composition of the basket is undisclosed）.Aside from political pressures ahead of the G-20 summit, the regime change may be interpreted as a way to address
15、 the urgent need to stoke domestic demand in surplus countries （including China）. This shift will be necessary in order to rebalance and sustain global growth, given that deficit countries are retrenching.However, we caution that greater flexibility in the CNY regime, especially if combined with a B
16、BC of undisclosed or uncertain characteristics, could create more room for two-way spot FX movement against major currencies within the basket. The uncertainty could provide the PBoC greater discretion to manage the CNYs real effective exchange rate, albeit at the cost of some autonomy in monetary p
17、olicy. The longer-term effect could well be a paradoxical eventual depreciation against the USD, which would help offset the competitiveness losses from the recent sharp fall in the EUR. After all, the euro zone is Chinas largest export destination.Greater flexibility of Chinas exchange rate is nece
18、ssary for Chinese and global adjustment. An economy growing as fast as Chinas needs tighter monetary conditions than a sluggish U.S. economy which continues to need monetary stimulus. Importing U.S. monetary policy limits the tools China has to promote domestic demand, forcing it to rely instead on
19、financial repression to channel funds to increase production and reduce inflationary pressures. Chinese private consumption has continued to pick up, but allowing the RMB and thus Chinese purchasing power to appreciate is a pre-condition for Chinese and global growth. Macro-prudential regulations, i
20、ncluding a shift away from policy based loans and a gradual increase in interest rates to reduce the transfers of Chinese household savings to corporations are even more important.Even if the Chinese authorities allow two-way movement against the dollar to reduce speculation, Chinese policies could
21、support the U.S. Treasury market, commodities and risky assets more generally-especially if other EM countries might take a cue from China and allow only gradual depreciation. A sharp appreciation against the euro and dollar, without other policies to support Chinese consumption, could contribute to
22、 much slower global growth and higher inflation as higher Chinese production costs are transmitted to G-10 consumers. Chinas labor costs have already resumed the gradual upward grind that began in 2007 and 2008; demographics, labor unrest and militancy （strikes） and policies to develop rural areas s
23、uggest that they will continue to climb. This world could be one in which countries compete for a shrinking market share, putting risky assets under more pressure.Rachel Ziemba is senior analyst for China at Roubini Global Economics; Natalia Gurushina is RGEs director of emerging markets strategy and Arnab Das is RGEs managing director of market research and strategy.