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5、RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. is a registe
6、red trademark. Published 2006 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 202, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http:/www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additio
7、nal information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: orderrand.org 1 Roger Cliff1 The RAND Corporation Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission March 16, 2006 Mr. Chairman: Thank you for inviting me to participate in todays heari
8、ng on this important topic. I should begin by pointing out that the findings I present today are based not just on my own work but on the results of a collaborative effort between me and my RAND colleague Evan Medeiros. Evan was the lead author of a recently published RAND study called A New Directi
9、on for Chinas Defense Industry to which I was the other major contributor. Evan could not be here today so my testimony will draw on both my work and his, although he should not be held responsible for anything I say as he has not had a chance to review it. For the first two decades after the launch
10、 of Chinas economic reform program in the late 1970s, Chinas defense industries were best and often described as moribund. With a few notable exceptions such as ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, much of their output consisted of systems based on Soviet technology and designs from the 1950s. S
11、ince the late 1990s, however, Chinas defense industries have begun turning out an increasing number of recognizably modern weapon systems. Although the capabilities of these weapons fall short of the most advanced systems now entering the U.S. inventory, they are comparable in capability to the syst
12、ems we fielded in the 1970s and 1980s that still make up the bulk of our forces. If the United States is to keep its qualitative military advantage over China, therefore, we will need to continue to develop and field systems that are significantly more advanced than the types currently in our invent
13、ory and that China is now in the process of developing and fielding. Background and Recent Changes in Chinas Defense Industries Chinas defense industries were originally established with Soviet assistance during the 1950s and organized according to the Soviet model as government ministries. This str
14、ucture persisted well into Chinas economic reform era which began in the late-1970s, except for the 6th Machine Building Industry which was converted into a state-owned company, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, in 1982. Chinas other defense industries remained government 1 The opinions and
15、conclusions expressed in this testimony are the authors alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal,
16、state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private secto
17、rs around the world. RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2 ministries, in some cases combined together with purely civilian industries. In 1993, however, most of the defense industries that remained under the control of government ministri
18、es were also converted into three more state-owned corporations with sometimes somewhat misleading names, especially in English: Aviation Industries of China; China Aerospace Corporation, which developed and produced missiles and space systems; Northern Chinese Industries Corporation, which develope
19、d and produced weapons for ground forces, and China National Nuclear Corporation, which produced civilian and military nuclear power systems. The only defense sectors that remained under direct government control were Chinas nuclear weapons complex, which remained under the control of the government
20、s Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), and Chinas defense electronics complex, which remained under the control of the Ministry of Electronics Industry. In 1999 Aviation Industries of China, China Aerospace Corporation,
21、 Northern Chinese Industries Corporation, China National Nuclear Corporation, and China State Shipbuilding Corporation were each divided into two nominally independent companies, and in 2002 Chinas defense electronics complex was converted into a state-owned corporation, the China Electronic Technol
22、ogy Corporation. Thus, Chinas defense industry now consists primarily of eleven state- owned corporations, plus the nuclear weapons complex.2 In addition to bifurcating its state-owned defense companies, China made a number of other changes in its defense industrial sector in the late 1990s. First,
23、until 1998 COSTIND was a joint military-civilian body responsible both for running Chinas defense industries and for overseeing the procurement of equipment by Chinas military. In 1998, however, the old COSTIND was abolished and replaced by a purely civilian body with the same name. The new COSTINDs
24、 role is to regulate Chinas defense manufacturers and to facilitate coordination between them and Chinas military. COSTIND also oversees a number of defense-related universities and colleges as well as the Southwest Institute of Engineering Physics, which develops nuclear weapons. At the same time a
25、s COSTIND was abolished and recreated, a new general department of Chinas military was created, the General Armaments Department.3 The General Armaments Departments role is to oversee the acquisition and maintenance of the PLAs weapon systems. By removing the acquisition function from COSTIND and cr
26、eating the General Armaments Department, China has created within the PLA an advocate for the PLAs interests in the 2 Chinas military also employs communications and information processing equipment produced by firms outside of the official defense industrial complex. 3 The other general departments
27、 are the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department. 3 development and procurement of weapon systems that is independent of the interests of Chinas defense industries. On paper at least, this is a very significant move as, by giving the military
28、control over which systems it acquires, it should force Chinas defense industries to be much more responsive to the needs of the Chinese military than they were in the past. In practice, of course, both the General Armaments Department and COSTIND remain embedded in Chinas larger government bureaucr
29、acy and thus the General Armaments Department is not a truly independent, autonomous actor. This weakens the incentives for Chinas defense industries to improve the quality and prices of their products. Chinas government has also taken steps over the past few years to rationalize and streamline its
30、defense companies. Significant numbers of workers have been laid off or reduced through attrition, and some money-losing enterprises have been shut down. Chinas eleven defense companies are actually holding companies containing dozens of subordinate enterprises and many of these enterprises are now
31、responsible for their own finances. Chinas defense industries have also undoubtedly benefited from the rapidly increasing technological capabilities in Chinas broader economy and improved knowledge of Chinas scientists, engineers, and managers. Chinas growing integration into the world economy has r
32、esulted in an increasing number of enterprises in China, both foreign-invested and wholly Chinese-owned, that possess state-of-the-art production equipment and know-how and employ modern production management and quality control techniques. Although the technologies these firms employ are not necess
33、arily defense-related, they form part of the overall economic environment in which Chinas defense industries are embedded and represent a source of technical know-how and management expertise that Chinas defense industries can draw on. Similarly, the improvement and growing exposure to Western teach
34、ing and scientific methods of Chinas universities and technical schools means that they are turning out increasingly well- trained and independent-thinking scientists, engineers, and technicians. And as salaries and working conditions in Chinas defense industries improve, they are increasingly able
35、to attract high-quality university and technical school graduates as well as employees of high-tech civilian enterprises and Chinese nationals who have been studying or working abroad. Perhaps the most significant change in Chinas defense industries in recent years, however, has been a dramatic incr
36、ease in the amount of resources flowing to them. As is well known, Chinas defense budgets have been increasing rapidly in the past decade, but within those budgets spending on procurement has been increasing even more rapidly. Between 2000 and 2003, for example, while the official Chinese defense bu
37、dget increased at an average annual rate of over 16 percent, the amount the PLA spent on weapons procurement increased at an average annual 4 rate of over 18 percent. These increased financial flows enable defense enterprises to purchase advanced production equipment and to attract highly capable em
38、ployees from colleges, other enterprises, or abroad. Improvements in the Output of Chinas Defense Industries It is difficult to determine which of the changes described above has been the most crucial, but their net effect has been a qualitative improvement in the output of Chinas defense industries
39、 in recent years. Chinas defense companies are now producing systems that, while not cutting edge, are comparable to those that dominate the inventories of the United States and other advanced militaries. The Type 98 tank, for example, is assessed to be comparable in capability to the main battle ta
40、nks of other Western countries, although so far it has been produced in small numbers. Similarly, China has launched two classes of destroyers expected to have air defense capabilities comparable to those of U.S. Aegis-class cruisers and destroyers. China is currently producing two classes of modern
41、 diesel-electric submarines and is building a new class of nuclear submarine expected to be comparable to the Los Angeles-class ships that comprise the bulk of the U.S. attack submarine force. The C-802 anti-ship missile carried by Chinas naval combatants is comparable in capability to early version
42、s of the Harpoon missile that still equips U.S. naval combatants. Since the 1990s the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation has been co-producing, with Russian assistance, Su-27 air superiority fighters, which are roughly comparable to the U.S. F-15. More recently, an indigenously built light fighter, the J
43、-10, which is comparable in performance to an F- 16, has reached initial operational capability. Chinas PL-9 infrared-homing air-to-air missile is comparable in capability to the U.S. AIM-9M “Sidewinder,” which was in production until the end of 2004, and China is developing an active radar guided m
44、issile, the PL-12, which is expected to be comparable in capability to the U.S. AIM-120 “AMRAAM.” China is also believed to have developed and be testing an airborne early warning and control aircraft comparable to the U.S. AWACS. Other systems under development in China include a surface-to-air mis
45、sile system that is expected to be comparable in capability to the Russian SA-10 system or early versions of the U.S. Patriot, a cruise missile expected to be comparable to the U.S. Tomahawk system, and a high-speed anti-radiation missile. Perhaps Chinas best-known weapon systems are its short-range
46、 conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. These systems provide China with a unique capability possessed by virtually no other 5 country and one that is extremely difficult to counter. The missiles are solid fuel and carried on road-mobile launchers, meaning that it is extremely difficult to locate
47、and attack them before they are launched, and the latest models are believed to have accuracies of less than 50 meters. Although the output of Chinas defense industries has advanced rapidly in recent years, it is not clear how much of this is the result of significant technological innovation in Chi
48、na. All of the classes of systems described above were first developed in other countries, in most cases decades before China began producing them. China has also received considerable technical assistance from Russia and Israel, and much of the equipment used to produce these weapons is imported. C
49、ertain technologies may have been acquired through espionage. In the case of Chinas short-range ballistic missiles, although China has the most capable force of this type in the world, this is not because other countries are incapable of fielding such systems. In particular, the United States and Russia are prohibited under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty from fielding land-based missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 k