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1、Q1 2012 defence those who favour a secular state and those who favour one with a more Islamist character; and numerous ethnic and tribal divisions. A failure to build a new state would run the risk of power vacuums, which could allow Islamist militants to establish a deeper presence in Libya, to th
2、e detriment of European security. Iran Irans nuclear programme has dropped off the international radar somewhat, but will remain a key source of global risk. Indeed, we believe that Western intervention against Libya has hardened Irans resolve to maintain its nuclear programme. Essentially, Qadhafi
3、gave up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 in return for improved political and economic ties with Western nations. At the time, this seemed like a mutually beneficial arrangement. However, the speed with which the West turned against Qadhafi in early 2011 and attacked Libya wi
4、ll serve as a sober warning to Tehran that the West cannot be trusted, and that Irans security ultimately lies with effective deterrence rather than political promises. Nonetheless, reports suggest that Irans nuclear programme has suffered from technical problems, especially at its new Bushehr nucle
5、ar plant, which were apparently caused by the Stuxnet computer virus (which is widely believed to be a form of cyber-warfare by Israel and/or the US). At the same time, somewhat less alarmist Israeli assessments of the timetable for Iran developing a nuclear bomb suggest that US or Israeli military
6、strikes on Iran are less likely in the near term. We retain our belief that the chances of a US or Israeli attack on Iran before the end of 2012 are still well below 50%. The main risk to this assessment stems from whether the current unrest in MENA is perceived to enhance Tehrans geopolitical stand
7、ing in the region. There is a possibility that Israeli policymakers will conclude that Turkeys increasingly confrontational stance towards their country and Egypts more populist and pro-Palestinian position have gravely undermined the Jewish states security, and that in order to reassert their milit
8、ary supremacy in the region they would need to attack Iran. Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 15 An Israeli strike on Iran could in fact receive tacit support from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iran is widely suspected of fomenting Shia unrest in Bahrain,
9、 eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, although in some cases this is very difficult to prove. Even if Iranian support for the regions Shia is exaggerated, Tehran hopes to benefit from the weakening of traditional pro-US regimes in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere. On the domestic front
10、, Iran remains vulnerable to instability due to economic stresses, high inflation, a weakening currency and an ongoing power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and senior clerics loyal to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This suggests that the atmosphere in the run-up to the M
11、arch 2012 parliamentary elections will become increasingly acrimonious, and we may well see more officials removed from their posts as part of the political jockeying. Although Khamenei does not appear likely to remove Ahmadinejad from the presidency before the latters term ends in mid- 2013, he is
12、seeking to reduce Ahmadinejad to lame duck status, in the hope that a more pliable replacement will succeed him. Afghanistan The US is pressing ahead with withdrawing 33,000 surge troops from Afghanistan by mid-2012, starting with the departure of 10,000 soldiers by the end of 2011. The cuts are ste
13、eper than US generals favour, and suggest that Obamas policy is increasingly being determined by the need to please voters ahead of the November 2012 presidential election. Indeed, public support for rapid troop withdrawals is at a record high of 56%. We see a real risk that the accelerated troop cu
14、t could undermine gains made during the military surge from December 2009 to June 2010. In addition, with the US now clearly on the way out of Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgents could feel increasingly confident. This was evident by some bold raids on Western targets in Kabul in September 2011, and
15、 the assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani (who was still a key political player) on September 20. The Taliban could either step up their attacks, or alternatively lie low until most Western troops have departed, at which point the insurgents could resume their military campai
16、gn with fewer obstacles. Beyond the US election, the Western powers are aiming to hand full responsibility for Afghanistans security to the Kabul government at the end of 2014. However, we believe that this timetable is too optimistic, in light of the current stalemate between Afghan government forc
17、es and the Taliban, the absence of a political settlement between the two sides, and the difficulties experienced by Western military instructors in building up an effective Afghan National Army (ANA). We thus expect the US to negotiate a permanent military presence in Afghanistan, albeit on a much
18、smaller scale than the current 100,000-strong deployment. Reports in the international media in August 2011 suggested that the US might keep as many as 25,000 troops in Afghanistan until 2024. Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 16 The Korean Peninsula
19、For the same reasons as Iran, Western intervention in Libya will further reduce (if at all possible) the chances of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons. Despite this, and even after two major North Korean military provocations in 2010, inter-Korean tensions have calmed somewhat. Indeed, Hong
20、Joon- pyo, chairman of the Souths ruling Grand National Party, paid a rare visit the North on September 30 2011. Nonetheless, we do not expect a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations until 2013 at the earliest. This is because Pyongyang appears to be waiting for South Korean President Lee Myu
21、ng-bak to leave office in early 2013, and hopes that his successor will adopt a more conciliatory stance towards the North. Overall, we expect the Korean Peninsula to remain tense going into 2012, as North Korean leader Kim Jong Il prepares to transfer power to his son Kim Jong Un. This requires the
22、 support of the military and necessitates a hardline policy towards the South. We therefore continue to see the possibility of a new North Korean nuclear test in 2012, or a long-range missile test. A new naval confrontation in the West Sea is also a possibility. The key dates to watch are February 1
23、6 2012, when Kim Jong Il will mark his 70th birthday and, more prominently, April 15 2012, when North Korea will celebrate the centennial of the birth of its late founder, Kim Il Sung. The regime may well seek to drum up a martial or triumphant atmosphere at home through military provocations. The c
24、entennial is also likely to see a further elevation in the position of Kim Jong Un, who may formally be designated as his fathers successor. From our point of view, the biggest risk on the Korean Peninsula is miscalculation, as the North seeks to test the limits of the Souths tolerance for confronta
25、tion. Following Pyongyangs provocations in 2010, President Lee ordered the Souths military to bolster its forces in the West Sea border region and toughen the rules of engagement vis-vis the North in future such instances. There is thus a risk that North Korea will once again initiate a confrontatio
26、n in the West Sea area, and that next time round, the Souths response will be fiercer, resulting in more casualties on both sides. Falling short of a full-scale war, we can envisage a bigger clash than seen thus far that results in scores or even hundreds of casualties. Another major risk is that Ki
27、m Jong Il might die suddenly, without having consolidated his sons position within the hierarchy. This could lead to a destabilising power struggle behind the faade of a military-dominated collective leadership. A further key question for North Korea is whether it will succumb to MENA-style politica
28、l upheaval. We think that the closed nature of the North and the absence of access to the internet, global media, and social networking, not to mention the leaderships willingness to use deadly force, will prevent people power from converging in the streets and squares of Pyongyang. Nonetheless, we
29、do not preclude an eventual Libya-style regional uprising that could take the North to the brink of civil war. Although this does not Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 17 appear imminent, a putative North Korean civil war would quickly escalate into a
30、 regional crisis, most probably dragging in China, South Korea, and the US, whose interests will not necessarily overlap. Table: Election Timetable, 2012 Country Region Election type Date Ruling party or nominated candidate Opposition party or candidate Expected outcome STPR* January Taiwan Asia Pre
31、sidential January 14 Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) Ma win 83.3 Taiwan Asia Legislative January 14 Kuomintang (KMT) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Too uncertain 83.3 Finland Europe Presidential January 22 Sauli Niinisto (National Coalition Party) Paavo Lipponen (SDP), Paavo Vayrynen (Cen-
32、 tre), Pekka Haavisto (Greens), Timo Soini (True Finns) Niinisto win 88.8 Gambia SSA Legislative January Alliance for Pat- riotic Reorienation and Construction (APRC) United Democratic Party APRC win na February Turkmen- istan Asia Presidential February 12 Gurbanguly Berd- ymukhamedov tba Berdymukh
33、amedov win 82.7 Senegal SSA Presidential February 26 Abdoulaye Wade (tbc) tba na 65.6 March Russia Europe Presidential March 4 Vladimir Putin (United Russia) Gennady Zyugan- ov (Communists) Putin win 74.2 Hong Kong Asia Chief executive March 25 Henry Tang Leung Chun-ying Tang win 86.0 Iran MENA Legi
34、slative March 29 Various Various na 42.7 April France Europe Presidential April 22 Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP) tba (Socialists) Socialist win 82.3 Serbia Europe Legislative April 22 For a European Serbia (ZES) coalition Serbian Progressive Party Too uncertain 54.8 Mali SSA Presidential April Dioncounda Tr
35、aor Ibrahim Boubacar Kta, Oumar Mariko Traor win 63.1 South Korea Asia Legislative April Grand National Party (GNP) Democratic Party (DP) DP gains 77.7 Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 18 Table: Election Timetable, 2012 Country Region Election type D
36、ate Ruling party or nominated candidate Opposition party or candidate Expected outcome STPR* May Armenia Europe Legislative May Republican Party of Armenia Prosperous Armenia na 61.3 Burkina Faso SSA Legislative May Congress For Democracy And Progress (CDP) Alliance for Democracy and Federation CDP
37、win 70.4 Georgia Europe Legislative May United National Movement Joint Opposition na 58.3 Seychelles SSA Legislative May Seychelles Peop- les Progressive Front (SPPF) Seychelles National Party - Democratic Party SPPF win 73.8 June France Europe Legislative June 10 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire S
38、ocialist Party Socialists gains 82.3 July Mexico Latin America Presidential July 1 tba Enrique Pea Nieto (PRI) (tba) Pea Nieto win 65.6 Mexico Latin America Legislative July 1 Partido Accin Nacional (PAN) Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) PRI win 65.6 Late 2012 China Asia Party Congress Aut
39、umn 2012 na na New leadership 78.5 Venezuela Latin America Presidential October 7 Hugo Chvez (tba) tba Too uncertain 58.1 Ukraine Europe Legislative October 28 Party of Regions Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine Too uncertain 65.4 US North America Presidential November 6 Barack Obama (Democratic Par
40、ty) tba (Republican Party) Too uncertain 85.8 US North America Legislative November 6 Democratic Party Republican Party Republican gains 85.8 Ghana SSA Presidential December John Atta Mills Nana Akufo-Addo Too uncertain 72.7 Ghana SSA Legislative December National Demo- cratic Congress New Patriotic
41、 Party Too uncertain 72.7 Kenya SSA Presidential December tba Raila Odinga Too uncertain 65.4 Kenya SSA Legislative December PNU-ODM Coalition PNU, ODM (as separate parties) Too uncertain 65.4 Brazil Defence and Security Report Q1 2012 Business Monitor International Ltd Page 19 Table: Election Timet
42、able, 2012 Country Region Election type Date Ruling party or nominated candidate Opposition party or candidate Expected outcome STPR* South Korea Asia Presidential December Park Geun-hye (Grand National Party) Sohn Hak-kyu (Democratic Party) Too uncertain 77.7 NB In several countries, election dates
43、 are tentative and may change; STPR = BMIs short-term political risk rating (out of 100, with 100 the best); tba/tbc = to be announced/confirmed; na = not applicable, no clear party, or no house view; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA = Middle East and North Africa. Source: BMI, Reuters, Local media Un
44、ited States Stalemate To Persist, Heading Into Election Season Over the coming year, the US political scene will increasingly be dominated by presidential and congressional elections to be held in November 2012. The poor economic outlook makes it increasingly unlikely that President Barack Obama wil
45、l be elected to a second term in office. However, we maintain Obamas re-election as our core scenario until it becomes clear which Republican Party candidate will oppose him. Meanwhile, we expect the Republican majority in the House of Representatives to continue to present obstacles to policy forma
46、tion, as has proven the case throughout 2011 in several votes on fiscal policy. The major policy focus of Q411 is likely to be the bipartisan congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which is due to issue a recommendation by November 23 2011 on reducing the federal budget deficit b
47、y US$1.5trn over the next decade. If the committee cannot agree on a set of recommendations, or Congress rejects the recommendations, US$1.2trn in spending reductions would automatically be enacted, with defence spending particularly hard-hit. Given the rancour that surrounded the debates on raising
48、 the debt limit in July 2011, and the lukewarm Republican response to President Obamas job creation plan unveiled in September that year, we believe that the stage is set for further partisan bickering leading up to the joint committees legislative recommendations. This almost certainly means that t
49、he federal government will not be in a position to enact further fiscal stimulus, and in fact fiscal policy could tighten significantly if tax cuts are allowed to expire and government spending is slashed. In turn, we expect an angry electorate (congressional disapproval ratings are well in excess of 80% according to all of the major pollsters) to punish incumbents at the ballot box. As such, we retain our core view that the Republican Par