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1、本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：Capital Structure Decisions During a Firms Life CycleIn one of the most interesting studies on the capital structure of small business, Berger and Udell (1998) asserted that general financial theory is not applicable to all businesses. Instead, the particular phase of a businesss
2、 life cycle determines the nature of its financial needs, the availability of financial resources, and the related cost of capital. This approach supports financial behaviors that are life-cycle-specific. As argued by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), the changing degree of informational opacity that a f
3、irm faces drives its financial life cycle. From its inception to maturity, the financial needs of a firm change according to its ability to generate cash, its growth opportunities, and the risk in realizing them. This will be reflected by evolving financing preferences and the nature of the specific
4、 financial choices that a firm makes during its life cycle. As a consequence, firms at the earlier stages of their life cycles, which arguably tend to have larger levels of asymmetric information, more growth opportunities, and reduced size, should have specific capital structure drivers and should
5、apply specific financing strategies as they advance through the different phases of their life cycles.Despite recent attention to this topic, data on the financing structure of firms during the course of their life cycles is rather limited, and results are inconclusive (Gregory et al. 2005). Thus, w
6、e still need to extend our understanding of firms financial choices in this area, verifying, in particular, the existence of a pro-tempore optimal capital structure and the drivers that are potentially relevant to explain capital structure decisions as the firms progress along the different phases o
7、f their life cycle. In some contexts, equity (specifically, venture capital) has been shown to play a role in the early stages, while debt becomes relevant only in the late stages. In other contexts, the support of a financial intermediary (bank) is fundamental in the early stages, whereas the capit
8、al structure is rebalanced in later stages. There is common consensus regarding the importance of the institutional environment in which a small firm is based (Beck et al. 2002, 2005). To operate in the USA or in Italy, small businesses must have access to a different variety of financial solutions
9、in order to sustain their business in the light of asymmetric information. Thus, the financing preferences of these firms are complex, and the appropriateness of the available options deserves further research.The study reported here contributes to this area of research in that it seeks to verify wh
10、ether the life cycle is a relevant factor in a firms financing behavior. Empirical analysis is used to evaluate the role of the life cycle and the differences in the determinants of the debt/equity ratio throughout the life cycles of Italian small businesses. Specifically, the following questions ar
11、e addressed: Do Italian firms have different financial structures during different stages of their life cycles? How do Italian capital structure determinants change in the course of a firms life cycle?The paper is structured as follows. The first part examines the strategic financing choices of firm
12、s through a formal research hypothesis. In the second part, the sample is introduced, the variables and the model are applied, and the results are shown. The third part presents the conclusions and a discussion of the implications for management and for future research.2 Capital structure and financ
13、ial life cycleThe concept that firms evolve through a financial life cycle is well established in the literature. There is, however, disagreement regarding sequential financing choices and the debt/equity ratio. Moreover, the lifecycle paradigm does not fit all small businesses (Berger and Udell 199
14、8), and differences exist not only in terms of management determination but also in terms of different industry affiliations and institutional environments in which firms operate (Harris and Raviv 1991; Beck et al. 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2004; Utrero-Gonzalez 2007). In their review of the capital
15、structure literature, Harris and Raviv (1991) note that it is generally accepted that firms in a given industry will have similar leverage ratios, which are relatively stable over time, while leverage ratios vary across industries. Specifically, the industry is a significant determinant of leverage,
16、 which alone has been found to explain up to 25% of within-country leverage variation (Bradley et al. 1984). Moreover, the institutional environment also has a crucial influence on capital structure decisions, as recently documented by Titman et al. (2003) for large companies, and by Gaud et al. (20
17、05) for small firms. More than the type of financial system (market-based or bank-based), it is the efficiency of the financial system (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wald 1999; Booth et al. 2001) and of the general institutional context (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995) that determin
18、es the financial growth of firms affecting capital structure decisions. Therefore, hypotheses on capital structure determinants must take industry affiliation and the institutional environment into account. This is very much the case for firms that are particularly opaque and affected by asymmetric
19、information.2.1 Financial life cycle: theory and hypothesisSeveral hypotheses, as synthesized in Table 1, can be proposed for the consideration of the life cycle in explaining firms financing behavior.The use of internal resources as a substitute for external finance must be acknowledged, as in the
20、pecking-order theory, because these reflect the severity of asymmetric information problems. Accordingly, in this study, Hypothesis 1 deals with the role of profitability and the preferences regarding internal resources versus debt. Hypotheses 2 and 3, each of which is further divided into two formu
21、lations, address the different theoretical financial preferences during the life cycle of a firm. Hypothesis 2a attempts to describe the financial life cycle with respect to the age of a firm, while Hypothesis 3a is the reverse formulation. Hypothesis 2b attempts to describe the financial life cycle
22、 with respect to the role of a firms reputation, while Hypothesis 3b is the reverse formulation. Finally, due to the fact that the previously mentioned effects can be heterogeneous for different industries and for firms operating in different institutional contexts, we explicitly take industry affil
23、iation and the context of analysis into account.Hypothesis 1: pecking-order theory. The main approach to interpreting capital structure choices from the asymmetric information point of view is the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers 1984), which suggests that firms finance their needs in a hierarchical
24、fashion. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) have pointed out the role of managerial preferences in the choice of financing resources. These choices are made by considering the relative costs of the various sources of finance due to information asymmetries and transaction costs. The pecking-ord
25、er theory proposes that firms prefer to use internal sources of capital, relying on external sources only when the internal ones are exhausted. As a result, firms prefer to use less information-sensitive securities, with retained earnings being the most preferred financing source, followed by debt,
26、and then equity capital. This implies that more-profitable firms will retain earnings and become less leveraged, while less-profitable firms will become more leveraged, thus demonstrating an inverse relation between profitability and financial leverage. The pecking-order theory seems particularly re
27、levant for small and medium-sized firms due to their typical features and limited access to external finance (Holmes and Kent 1991). In particular, the pecking-order hypothesis provides an instrumental tool for the analysis of the strategic financing problem of firms along the life cycle (Rocha Teix
28、eira and dos Santos 2005). It states that no optimal level of debt becomes objectively evident; rather, it becomes apparent as a firms situation changes over time. Thus, the proportion of debt in a firms capital structure is adjusted in response to the impending financial needs of the firm over its
29、life cycle. Empirical evidence from previous studies that have examined small and medium-sized firms (Chittenden et al. 1996; Michaelas et al. 1999) was consistent with the pecking-order argument, since leverage was found to be negatively related to profitability. Therefore, the empirical model empl
30、oyed here included profitability, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Ebitda) to capital (Michaelas et al. 1999; Fama and French 2002; Sogorb-Mira 2005).Hypothesis 2a: financial life cycle. For start-ups, which are the most informationally opaque type of busin
31、ess, it is difficult to obtain external funding (Berger and Udell 1998). Information opacity prevents investors in small firms from distinguishing between high-quality and low-quality companies. Consequently, Berger and Udell (1998) argued that debt, due to the higher interest rate applied by lender
32、s to hedge against the higher default probability, is costly for young firms. Due to asymmetric information, young, informationally opaque firms are less leveraged. This phenomenon can inhibit small firms from using external funding at all (Weinberg 1994), in addition to the fact that cash-flows are
33、 needed to service interest payments, and small and young businesses are typically not able to generate positive cash-flows in the early stages. Consequently, according to Fluck (2000) and to the empirical results of Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996), young firms are financed mainly b
34、y insiders, business angels, and venture capital. Equity as a source of funds allows the soundness of an investment to be monitored, while patient capital can wait for long-term economic returns on investments and thereby meet the long-term financial needs of a young firm. Especially given an imperf
35、ect market, the venture capitalist professionally supports a young firm with his or her financial resources and skills (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003). In this context, Carey et al. (1993) and Helwege and Liang (1996) showed that small entrepreneurial firms frequently issue outside equity before they is
36、sue debt. Bank debt is typically more readily available after a firm has achieved significant tangible assets that might be collateralized. The use of debt increases over time and becomes particularly important in the maturity stage of a business (Berger and Udell 1998). As a firm goes through its l
37、ife cycle, becoming mature and less informationally opaque, its financing choices change, including better access to the debt market (Chittenden et al. 1996). Therefore, leverage increases with age, as young firms are financially constrained while old firms have convenient access to external finance
38、. Therefore, this life-cycle pattern of firm financing assumes that small firms will use outside equity first (such as venture capital finance) and retained earnings, issuing debt at last to satisfy their subsequent financing needs. This approach contrasts with that described in the pecking-order mo
39、del mainly with respect to the financing choices of start-up firms.Hypothesis 2b: reputational effect. A reputation argument also supports the convenient use of debt only in the maturity stage. Young firms, without past experience and a track record, have a low debt capacity. Vice versa, firms that
40、have consolidated their business, with a past history, past profitability, track record, and credibility and reliability in the product market, are not constrained in the credit market and can obtain finance under good economic terms. These firms can have developed a positive reputation to be spent
41、on the financial market (Diamond 1989). Therefore, early in the life cycle, small businesses have little repayment history or record of profitability upon which external suppliers of funds can rely. For such firms, internal resources (from entrepreneurs or their families) are fundamental, and when t
42、hese are exhausted, venture capital becomes the primary choice. After a period of sufficient profits as well as of reliability and credibility in the market, firms can gain a positive reputation and are thus able to readily obtain the required financing, including debt (Hirshleifer and Thakor 1992).
43、 As the firm matures, outside stakeholders can examine the firms track record and its creditworthiness over time. A firms reputation can mitigate the problem of asymmetric information and improve its access to external sources of funding, such as trade credit and bank debt (Diamond 1989). Thus, gain
44、ing a reputation in the market over time and reducing moral hazard problems provide older firms with better conditions for using debt as a source of finance. As stated by Diamond (1989), older firms will be able to increase their use of debt. Empirically, Fluck et al. (1998) find that the proportion
45、 of funds from insiders increases during the early stages of a firms life cycle, while the proportion of outsider finance declines. However, at some point this relationship reverses. They interpret this result as a consequence of the development of a positive reputation in credit markets that allows
46、 the firm to obtain cheaper sources of external financing.Source: Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca and Alfio Cariola; “Capital Structure Decisions During a Firms Life Cycle”,Small Business Economics, Online First, 24 August 2009:Pages 1-24.译文：基于企业生命周期的资本结构决策在小企业资本结构的研究中，伯格和德尔（1998）有趣地发现，普遍的财务理论并不
47、适用于所有交易。进一步说，企业生命周期的特定阶段决定了资金需求的性质、财务资源的可用性和与此相关的资本成本。这一论断说明了特定生命周期具有特定的财务行为。科普兰和斯特伯格（2003）证明，一个企业的信息不透明的变化程度有助于经济生命周期的发展。从初期到成熟，企业的资金需求要根据其产生现金的能力、其成长机会和实现机会的风险而变化。这将从融资偏好的演变和企业基于生命周期所做出的具体财务决策的性质中得到反映。因此，企业处于生命周期的早期时，不对称信息的水平较高、成长机会更多、规模较为简化，应该用特定的资本结构驱动力以及制定特定的融资策略去应对企业生命周期不同阶段。不管最近对于这个话题有怎么样的进展，
48、在企业生命周期的各个过程中显示企业融资结构的数据还是相当有限，而且结果是不明确的（格雷戈里等2005）。因此我们仍然需要延伸对企业在这个领域中的财务决策的认识和验证，特别是短期最优资本结构的存在和企业随着生命周期的不同阶段发展过程中可能解释资本结构决策相关因素的了解。在一些文章中，权益（特别是风险资本）在企业生命周期初期的作用已经被认识到，债务则只在末期起作用。在另一些文章中，金融中介机构（银行）的支持在企业早期发展中起基础性作用，而资本结构在以后的阶段中起到重新平衡的作用。关于制度环境基础对一家小企业的重要性已是大家普遍认同的观点(贝克等2002，2005)。要想在美国或者意大利生存，小企业
49、必须使用各种不同的财务策略去维持他们在信息不对称情况下的各种业务。因此，这些企业的融资偏好是复杂的，有效选择的适当性值得进一步研究。该研究报告有助于在这一研究领域力图核实企业生命周期是否是其融资行为的相关因素。在意大利小企业中，通常用经验分析来评价企业生命周期所扮演的角色和在生命周期各个阶段中债权比率决定因素方面的差别。具体地说，解决了以下几个问题：意大利企业在不同的生命周期阶段中拥有不同的财务结构吗？在企业生命周期不同阶段中，意大利的资本结构决定因素如何改变？文章结构如下：第一部分，通过正式的研究假设调查了企业的战略性融资选择。第二部分，引用案例，建立变量数据模型，显示结果。第三部分，得出结论，讨论本文对管理和未来研究方向的影响。2.资本结构和财务生命周期企业通过财务生命周期发展的理念已经充分地在各种文献中得到确立。但是，连续的融资选择和债权比率还是存在一些异议。此外，生命周期模式并不适合所有小企业（伯格和德尔，1998），这其中的差异不仅存在于管理决策方面，而且也存在于企业面临的不同行业联盟和环境制度方面（哈里斯和瑞佛1991；贝克等2002；拉詹和金格拉斯2004；崔洛-高扎勒斯2007）。根据哈里斯和瑞佛关于