国际货币与金融经济学课件06.doc

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1、Chapter 6: International Banking, Central Banks, and Supranational Financial Policymaking InstitutionsI. Chapter OverviewChapter 6 is devoted to explaining some of the key institutional details of the international banking and payments system, central banking, and supranational financial policymakin

2、g institutions. The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of financial intermediation, and discusses two important reasons for the existence of indirect finance through intermediaries: (1) the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and leaders, including situations that involve

3、 potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and (2) economies of scale.The chapter also describes various aspects of national banking systems. The chapter compares financial systems, such as Germanys relatively bank-dominated system versus the U.S. systems mix of market and bank finance.

4、 Also considered are major global bank payment systems and their risks, which include liquidity risk, credit risk, systemic risk, and Herstatt risk. This lays the groundwork for a discussion of possible sources of financial instability and international financial crises, including inconsistencies of

5、 official exchange rates with economic fundamentals that engender speculative attacks, self-fulfilling anticipations and contagion effects, and structural moral hazard problems. The chapter next describes the various objectives of bank regulation and supervision, such as limiting the scope for insol

6、vencies and failures, maintaining liquidity, and promoting efficiency. It addresses key programs, such as systems of bank capital requirements and deposit insurance, which many governments have adopted to promote banking stability. The next major section considers central bank assets and liabilities

7、 and the various functions of central banks, including governmental depositories and fiscal agents, regulators of other banks, and monetary policymakers. For the last category, four different monetary policy instruments are discussed in detail: (1) interest rate policies on central bank advances, (2

8、) open market operations, (3) reserve requirements, and (4) interest rate regulations and direct credit controls.The chapter concludes with a description of the worlds two main supranational financial policymaking institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The structures and f

9、unctions of both institutions of both institutions are explained, as are the differences in their missions and operations. II. OutlineA. International Dimensions of Financial Intermediation1. Financial Intermediation2. Economies of Scale3. Financial Intermediation across National Boundariesa. Intern

10、ational Financial Intermediationb. Economies of Scale and Global BankingB. Banking Around the Globe1. Bank vs. Market Finance2. Differences in Bank Market Structure3. A New Convergence: Universal Banking4. Secrecy and TaxationC. Global Payments and Financial System Risks1. Global Payment Systems a.

11、Non-Electronic Payment Systems b. Electronic Payment Systems2. Payment System Risksa. Liquidity Riskb. Credit Riskc. Systemic Riskd. Herstaat Risk3. Financial Instability and International Financial Crisesa. Economic Imbalances and International Financial Crisesb. Self-Fulfilling Expectations and Co

12、ntagion Effectsc. Structural Moral Hazard ProblemsD. Bank Regulation and Capital Requirements1. Goals of Bank Regulationa. Limiting the Scope of Bank Insolvencies and Failures b. Maintaining Bank Liquidityc. Promoting an Efficient Banking System2. Bank Capital Requirementsa. Computing Required Capit

13、alb. Toughening the Basel Capital Standardsc. Market-Based Regulation? E. Central Banks1. Central Bank Assets2. Central Bank Liabilities and Net Worth F. What Do Central Banks Do?1. Central Banks as Government Banksa. Central Banks as Government Depositoriesb. Central Banks as Fiscal Agents2. Centra

14、l Banks as Bankers Banksa. Do Banks “Need” a Central Bank?b. Lenders of Last Resort3. Central Banks as Monetary Policymakersa. Interest Rates on Central Bank Advancesb. Open Market Operationsc. Reserve Requirementsd. Interest Rate Regulations and Direct Credit ControlsG. Supranational Financial Poli

15、cymaking Institutions1. The International Monetary Fund2. The World Bank H. Chapter Summary III. Fundamental Issues1. What accounts for international financial intermediation and how do national banking systems differ?2. What are the worlds major bank payment systems, and how the risks that arise in

16、 national financial and banking systems contribute to the potential for financial instability and crises?3. What objectives do national banking regulators seek to achieve and how do they implement their regulations?4. What are the main assets and liabilities of central banks?5. What are the primary

17、functions of central banks?6. What are the two most important supranational financial policymaking institutions, and what are their functions in the international financial system?IV. Chapter Features1. Online Notebook: Foreign Exchange Market Intermediation Moves to the WebThis notebook discusses a

18、lliances that major banks have formed to develop online exchanges for trading foreign currencies. Within just a few years, more than one-fifth of all foreign exchange trading has moved online. For Critical Analysis: Because banks are heavily involved in foreign exchange trading, they have developed

19、mechanisms for minimizing transactions costs, which they can pass on to many customers by charging fees that are lower than the transactions costs the customers would bear if they were to engage in foreign exchange trading on their own.2. Policy Notebook: Using Exchange Market Pressures to Assess Co

20、ntagion EffectsThis policy notebook examines recent research aimed at measuring the degree of exchange market pressure on a national currency. In the past, increased volatility of exchange market pressures has tended to precede various international financial crises.For Critical Analysis: A potentia

21、l advantage of monitoring measures of exchange market pressures is that doing so might allow policymakers to recognize that an international financial crisis is the offing and thereby intervene more quickly to reduce the magnitude of the crisis. A possible drawback is that if traders know that polic

22、ymakers use such measures to guide their policy interventions, traders could begin to engage in speculative activities based on movements in these measures, thereby actually hastening the onset of a crisis. 2. Policy Notebook: Governments Turn to Deposit Insurance to Try to Make Banks Safer than Mat

23、tressesThis notebook documents the increasing implementation of government deposit insurance systems around the globe. It points out that establishment of government deposit insurance does not necessarily make banks safer, because it reduces the incentive for depositors to monitor how banks use thei

24、r funds and lessens the incentive for bank managers to lend funds to the most creditworthy loan applicants.For Critical Analysis: Sudden insolvencies or illiquidities among a few banks could engender more widespread runs on banks; thus governments still have a rationale for supervise and regulate ba

25、nks in the absence of deposit insurance.V. Answers to End of Chapter Questions1. A key reason that an individual might hold a deposit with a bank that lends internationally, instead of making international loans directly, is the problem of asymmetric information, or the fact that potential internati

26、onal borrowers know more about their own prospects than the individual does. To avoid risks of loss arising from the adverse selection problem, or the likelihood that potential borrowers with high-risk projects will desire credit, the individual would have to screen international loan applicants car

27、efully. Yet this could be difficult to do across national boundaries. In addition, if the individual were to extend to loan to a borrower in another nation, the individual would have to find a way to continue to monitor the borrower to avoid moral hazard problems arising from the possibility that th

28、e borrower could engage in more risky behavior after receiving the loan. Banks, on the other hand, may have lending officers who are physically located in other nations, and they may have information-processing and monitoring technology linking their offices. In this way also, banks may be able to t

29、ake advantage of cost advantages accruing to their larger size. Consequently, banks may have an advantage in making loans across national boundaries.2. One benefit that a Dutch resident experiences from the presence of fewer banking institutions is that comparing the types of and relative qualities

30、of services is an easier task than it would be if there were many rival institutions. The Dutch resident also may gain from lower loan interest rates, higher deposit rates, and services prices resulting form economies of scale that relatively large banking institutions in the Netherlands may have at

31、tained. Nevertheless, there may be a definite disadvantage form having less choice among banking institutions, which is that these institutions may behave less competitively, which could in fact lead to higher loan rates, lower deposit rates, and higher prices of services.3. Whether bank secrecy in

32、locales such as Switzerland and Uruguay is or is not socially desirable is, of course, a matter of opinion. On the one hand, some bank depositors can use secrecy about banking transactions to hide illegal acts. On the other hand, the ability to conduct banking transactions without fear of publicity

33、can protect an individuals privacy. Thus, ones stand on this issue depends on weighing of the publics right to know versus the value of an individuals privacy.4. Because U.S. banking regulations have restrained competition in local banking markets, they arguably have led to the proliferation of many

34、 relatively smaller, isolated community banking markets, instead of a few larger, regional markets or even of a single national market for banking services. As a result, there may be many more banking institutions spread across many local markets, instead of a smaller number of banks competing in a

35、few large regional markets or in a national market.5. The banks capital-asset ratio is equal to it equity of 100 million yen divided by its total assets of 1,000 million yen, which equals 0.10, or 10 percent. Hence, the bank definitely meets the 4 percent capital-asset ratio requirement. Because cas

36、h assets and government securities receive a zero risk weight, this bank has 800 million yen in loans that it must count among risk-adjusted assets. Together with the assigned exposure of 400 million yen from derivatives trading, this yields a total amount of risk-adjusted assets equal to 1,200 mill

37、ion yen. Thus, the banks risk-adjusted core capital ration is equal to 100 million yen divided by 1,200 million yen, which is equal to just over 0.083, or 8.3 percent. Thus, the banks risk-adjusted core capital ratio also meets the 8 percent regulatory requirement.6. The primary assets of commercial

38、 banks are securities and loans to private individuals and businesses. For monetary policy purposes, other key assets include loans to private banks and foreign exchange reserves. The main liabilities of central banks are currency and reserve deposits of private banks.7. This is a question of inform

39、ed opinion. The key roles that the student might choose include monetary policymaker, depository for government funds, and banker and regulator for private banking firms. Students answers could also focus on whether central banks should be compartmentalized, multifunction, or streamlined (single-goa

40、l) institutions.8. Assets appearing on the left-hand side of the T-account are U.S. Treasury bills, Federal Reserve discount window loans to private banks, and the dollar value of euro-denominated cash and securities the Fed holds on deposit with the European Central Bank, and U.S. Treasury notes an

41、d bonds; total assets equal $650 billion. Liabilities appearing on the right-hand side of the T-account are funds that private banks hold on deposit with Federal Reserve Banks and Federal Reserve notes; total liabilities also equal $650 billion.9. Purchases in the foreign exchange market increase th

42、e central banks assets, so to prevent this from increasing total assets the central bank could increase the interest rate on advances to induce a reduction in desired private bank borrowing, thereby generating a decline in loans to private banks.10. The main overlap in the institutions functions is

43、that both make long-term loans intended to promote growth of developing and emerging nations. The World Bank, however, concentrates solely on this task, whereas the International Monetary Fund focuses much of its attention lending to promote short- and intermediate-term stabilization.VI. Multiple Ch

44、oice Questions1. Financial intermediation refers to A. the dealings between private banks and the central bank of that nation.B. legislation which is directed toward the regulation of the banking industry.C. the calculations involved in pricing financial instruments.D. indirect finance through the s

45、ervices of financial institutions that channel funds from savers to investors. Answer: D2. The fact that on party in a financial transaction often possesses information not available to another party is known asA. uncertainty.B. ethical hazard.C. asymmetric information.D. the double coincidence of w

46、ants. Answer: C3. An example of adverse selection is whenA. investors choose the riskiest financial instruments in an attempt to gain maximum returns. B. only the least creditworthy firms will be willing to borrow.C. the poorest run banks are mostly likely to be audited.D. banks display a bias in th

47、eir dealings with customers. Answer: B4. An example of moral hazard is whenA. the borrower engages in more risky behavior after receiving the funds than would have been the case prior to receiving the funds.B. the risks associated with a floating rate loan far exceed those associated with a fixed ra

48、te loan.C. borrowed funds are used to fund only the most creditworthy borrowers.D. the possibility of default on a loan is reduced by background checks. Answer: A5. Financial intermediaries most typically take advantage of economies of scale byA. insisting upon only large deposits.B. holding part of their portfol

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