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1、企业融资发展分析外文文献翻译word版本下载后可任意编辑】Analysis on the Chinese Enterprise FinancingAbstract：The mai n sources of financing for small and medium sized en terprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, l ong and short term bank credits, delayed payme nt on trade credit a nd other debt. The margi nal co
2、sts of each financing in strume nt are drive n by asymmetric in formatio n and tran sact ions costs associated with non payme nt. Accord ing to the Peck ing Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms cho ose finance so that
3、 the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additi onal Euro of financing is obta ined from all the sources whereas un der the Peck ing Order Theory the source is determ ined by how far dow n the Peck ing Order the firm is prese ntly located. In this paper, we argue that both
4、 of these theories miss the point that the margi nal costs are depe ndent of the use of the fun ds, and the asset side of the bala nee sheet primarily determ ines the financing source for an additi ona l Euro. An empirical an alysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SMEs con firms that the compositi
5、o n of the asset side of the bala nee sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Peck ing Order Theory and the traditi onal Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME the main sources of financing are equity (in ternally gen erated cash), trade credit, ban k credit and other debt. T
6、he choice of financing is drive n by the costs of the sources which is primar ily determ ined by costs of sol ving the asymmetric in formati on problem and the expected costs assoc iated with non-payme nt of debt. Asymmetric in formatio n costs arise from collecti ng and an alys ing i n formatio n t
7、o support the decisi on of exte nding credit, and the non-payme nt costs are from collectin g the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. SincdBMEs management and shareholders are oft en the same pers on, equity and in ternally gen erated funds have no asymmetric in formatio n costs an d equi
8、ty is therefore the cheapest source.1 Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested thdSME sin Portugal are financed using internal g en erated cash, cheap trade credits, l ong and short-term bank loa ns and expe nsive trade credits and o ther loa ns. In this secti on t
9、he motives behi nd the differe nt types of financing are discussed.1.1 Cheap Trade creditsThe first exter nal financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are in terest ing since they represe nt finan cial services provided by non-finan cial firms in competiti on with financia l
10、in termediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relatio n to the credit channel or the so called “ Meltzer effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary poli cy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to finan cial markets, in gen eral lar
11、ge well known f irms, issue trade credits to small finan cially con stra ined firms . The more rece nt research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and finan cial motive for issu ing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information rega
12、rding thefirm ' products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the qua ntity and quality before submitt ing pay men ts. By offeri ng trade finance the supplier sig nals to the buyers that they offer products of good q uality. Since small firms, in gen eral, have n
13、o reputati on the n these firms are forced to use trade credi ts to sig nal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore drive n by asymmetric i n formati on of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has lit tle in formati on about t
14、he supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their qu ality.The sec ond strategic motive is pric ing. Offeri ng trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduct ion for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reduc in
15、g prices or use them as a tool for price discrim in ati on betwee n differe nt buyers. Trade credit s are most adva ntageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alter native financing are higher tha n for borrowers with good credit rati ngs. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct pric
16、e discrim in ati on but also as an in direct tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers wi th a low credit sta nding.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relati on ships betwee n the supplier and the bu yers. This ofte n mani fests itself by the supplier exte n
17、ding the credit period in case the buyer has tem porary finan cial difficulties. Compared to finan cial in stituti ons suppliers have better kno wledge of t he in dustry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the pr oblems are of a more perma nent n ature.T
18、he last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on tran sact ions costs. Trade credit s are an efficie nt way of perform ing the tran sact ions since it is possible to separate betwee n delivery and payme nt. I n basic terms the truck driver deliveri ng the goods does not have to run
19、around to fin d the pers on resp on sible for pay ing the bills. The buyer also saves tran sacti ons costs by reduc ing the amount of cash requiredon “ hand”Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with finan cial in stituti ons in offeri ng credit to oth er firms. The traditi
20、onal view of finan cial in stituti ons is that they exte nd credit to firms where asym metric in formatio n is a major problem. Finan cial in stitutio ns have adva ntages in collecti ng and anal yzing in formati on from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asym
21、metric in formatio n. The key to this adva ntage over finan cial markets lies in the close relati ons hip betwee n the bank and the firm and in the payme nt fun ctio n. The finan cial in stituti on is able to m on itor the cash in flow and outflows of the firm by mon itori ng the acco unts of the fi
22、rm.But with trade credits non-finan cial firms are competi ng with finan cial in stituti ons in solvi ng t hese problems and exte nding credit. How can non-finan cial in stitutio ns compete in this market? Pet erse n and Rajan 1997 briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have adva ntages o
23、ver fina n cial in stituti ons. The supplier has a close worki ng associatio n with the borrower and more freque nt ly visits the premises tha n a finan cial in stituti on does. The size and timi ng of the len ders orders with the supplier provides in formati on about the con diti ons of the borrowe
24、rs bus in ess. Notice that this in formatio n is available to the supplier before it is available to the finan cial in stitutio n since the financ ial in stituti on has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payme nt disc ounts provides the supplier with an in dicati
25、on of problems with creditworthi ness in the firm. Aga in t he supplier obta ins the in formatio n before the finan cial in stituti on does. Thus the supplier may be a ble to obtai n in formatio n about the creditworthi ness faster and cheaper tha n the finan cial in stituti on.The supplier may also
26、 have adva ntages in collect ing payme nts. If the supplier has at least a loc al mon opoly for the goods the n the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incen tive for t he firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower on ly acco unts for a small fracti on of the s
27、uppliers bus in ess. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in gen eral has a be tter use for them tha n a finan cial in termediary sizi ng the same goods. Through its sales n etwork the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price tha n what is available to a
28、 finan cial in termediary. These adva ntages, of course, depe nd on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has tran sformed them.If asymmetric in formatio n is one of the driv ing forces the expla nati on of trade credits the n fir ms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued
29、them credits in order to obta in additi onal credit f rom the ban ks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better in formatio n thus the bank can use tr ade credits as sig nal of the credit worthi ness of the firm.That trade credits are in gen eral secured by the goods delivered also puts a lim
30、it on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtai n, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the en tire operat ions of the firm.In summary the predictio n is that the level of asymmetric in formatio n isrelatively low betwee n the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to this
31、suer geseral knowledge of the firm and the in dustry .In the empirical work below the variables explai ning the use of trade credit are credit r isk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Si nee these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered t o the firm, firms cannot “ borrow for more than the
32、 delivery value of the goods and services.1.2 Bank loa nsBanks have less in formati on tha n providers of trade credit and the costs of gatheri ng in formati on are also higher for banks tha n for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have a n adva ntage over banks in selli ng t
33、he collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and nu mber of tran sact ions banks have an adva ntage in selli ng gen eral collateral such as build in gs, mach inery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loa ns using tan gible assets as collateral, also due to a symmetric in form
34、ati on, they are less likely to issue loa ns to more opaque firms such as small and hi gh growth firms. Banks are therefore willi ng to lend long term provided that tan gible assets are avai lable for collateral. I n the empirical work below tan gible assets and credit risk variables are expecte d t
35、o expla in the use of Ion g-term bank loa ns and the amount of Ion g-term bank loa ns are limited by the value of tan gible assets.The basis for issu ing Short Term Bank Loa ns is the comparative adva ntages banks have in eval uati ng and collect ing on acco unts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is als
36、o possible to use Cash and Cash equivale nts as collateral but banks do not have any comparative adva ntages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluati ng and collect ing these since they con sist of cash and marketable securitie s. In terms of inven tories, aga in banks do not have any comparative adva ntages in evaluat ing these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in expla ining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loa ns.第5页