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1、.原文 Mitigating risks in cross-border acquisitionsIn the past 20 years, the volume of cross-border acquisitions for corporate assets has increased nearly three times faster than the volume of domestic acquisitions. Compared to domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions present greater challenge
2、s for a buyer because of institutions and cultural values that are unfamiliar to a foreign corporation. Firms acquiring assets in a foreign country may face different accounting practices and disclosure requirements, which hamper the due diligence process. The internalization of assets into the buye
3、r operational structure is further complicated by cultural peculiarities that determine how strategies are formulated and business is conducted. Acquiring firms may also encounter legal systems with different protection of property rights, a factor that adds uncertainty to future cash flows. The gre
4、ater level of uncertainty in cross-border acquisitions reduces the value of the assets being exchanged (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz, 2000) and appears as an explanation to the poor performance of acquirers in cross-border acquisitions (Denis et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). In this article,
5、 I will analyze different alternatives in which buyers can ameliorate the risks inherent in these transactions. This analysis is important for understanding the optimal entry strategies for firms that want to expand their operations in foreign markets. Acquiring firms can reduce investment uncertain
6、ty by structuring the payments so they are contingent on performance of the assets. This paper analyzes two alternative contingent payments.First, buyers can pay with stock, sharing the risk of the acquisition with the sellers as they will retain an equity position in the acquirer. Second, acquiring
7、 firms can use earn out payments contingent on the performance of the assets being acquired (Kohers and Ang, 2000).Buyers and sellers can operate assets together in an equity joint venture (JV) to improve the exchange of information on the quality of the assets. Nanda and Williamson (1995) describe
8、several JVs that were conceived as a mechanism to exchange information conducive to an eventual acquisition. In a sample of predominantly domestic JVs, Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) find that JVs can be mechanisms to transfer assets in the presence of valuation uncertainty. The purpose of this artic
9、le is to understand which of these mechanisms for reducing uncertainty is more beneficial to acquirers of cross-border corporate assets. I hypothesize that the use of earnouts and stock as a method of payment and the formation of equity JVs conducive to acquisitions should be more valuable when inve
10、stment uncertainty is more severe. This article contributes to the existing literature by testing this hypothesis in a sample of 30,783 acquisitions announced from 1985 to 2005. This sample involved buyers from 75 nations engaged in 6824 cross border-acquisitions of assets located in 128 countries.T
11、he results show that the valuation effects to acquirers in cross-border deals depend on the information obtained about the assets before the acquisition. Buyers experienced large gains in the acquisition of assets that were operated in a JV, suggesting that acquirers profited from the information ob
12、tained while jointly operating the assets. I hypothesize that these gains should be positively associated with the degree of uncertainty being resolved. Consistent with this hypothesis, acquirers experienced larger gains in the acquisitions of JVs located in countries with higher levels of investmen
13、t risk and in the presence of higher levels of valuation uncertainty.These results suggest that JVs can be used as a transitional mechanism to reduce the uncertainty associated with cross-border acquisitions in the presence of severe valuation uncertainties and country investment risks. Mechanisms t
14、o ameliorate investment risk in cross-border acquisitions.Although the evidence on the valuation effects to acquirers of cross-border acquisitions remains inconclusive, these buyers face higher levels of uncertainty for several reasons. The due diligence process is complicated by different accountin
15、g and disclosure requirements. Assimilation of assets is also more difficult because of cultural differences that determine how business is conducted. In addition, legal systems with different levels for protection of minority shareholders and enforceability of contracts increase the difficulty to v
16、alue future cash flows.How can buyers reduce the uncertainty associated with crossborder acquisitions? Reuer (2005) suggests the use of contingent payments and operational relationships. The use of stock as currency can be a contractual tool to reduce investment risk because it has a contingent-pric
17、ing effect (Hansen, 1987). The target firm, accepting stock, signals positive information on the value of the acquirer and on the assets being transferred. Buyers in turn signal their own quality as they prefer to use their stock when it is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, the final market
18、 reaction to announcements of using stock in acquisitions depends on the level of asymmetric information about the buyer and the target as well as their relative bargaining position. Acquiring firms can also reduce uncertainty by using earnout payments. Reuer et al. (2004) find that US firms use mor
19、e contingent payouts when purchasing assets in high-tech and services industries for a sample of 3098 deals in the period 19951998. Kohers and Ang (2000) analyze 938 mergers with earnout payments. They report that earnouts facilitate the transactions in the presence of high information asymmetries.B
20、uyers face higher levels of uncertainty in cross-border acquisitions. This article contributes to the extant literature by analyzing different mechanisms buyers can use to reduce investment uncertainty in a large sample of cross-border acquisitions of assets located in 128 countries. The results fro
21、m this analysis indicate that buyers experienced lower gains when the assets were located in a different country. The findings suggest that these inferior gains can be explained by more severe agency problems in buyers involved in cross-border acquisitions. The results indicate that acquiring firms
22、experienced larger gains in the acquisition of assets that were jointly operated in a JV. These larger gains to acquirers can not be explained by the listing effect, by the presence of call options embedded in JV contracts, or by expropriation of minority shareholders of target firms. The findings s
23、how that earnout payments were associated with larger gains to acquirers of domestic assets, but there is no indication that buyers benefited from these strategies in cross-border acquisitions. The results suggest that the exchange of information that occurs in a JV enhances acquirer value in cross-
24、border transactions in presence of higher levels of valuation uncertainty and country investment risk. Thus, JVs appear to be a valuable mechanism for reducing the risks inherent in cross-border acquisitions.Author: Tomas ManteconNationality: AmaricaOriginate form: Journal of Banking & Finance,2
25、009(33),640-641,650.:译文 跨国并购风险的缓解在过去的20年中，企业资产的跨国收购量比国内并购数量增加了近3倍。与国内并购相比，跨国并购面临一个更大的挑战 由于买方对外国公司的机构和文化价值观不熟悉。公司并购国外企业资产可能面对不同的会计方法和披露要求，这阻碍了尽职调查的过程。决定如何指定商业策略和经营业务的文化特殊性使得进入买方内部资产业务结构更为复杂。收购公司也可能会遇到不同产权保护制度的法律，这一因素增加了未来现金流量的不确定性。跨国并购中更大程度的不确定性减少了作为交换的资产价值（阿克洛夫，1970；斯蒂格利茨，2000），并作为跨国并购表现欠佳的解释体现出来（De
26、nis等人，2002年；Moeller和Schlingemann，2005）。 在这篇文章中，我会分析一些买家可以改善这些交易固有风险的不同方案。这一分析重要性是让那些希望在国外市场扩大业务的企业理解最佳进入策略。 收购公司调整投资结构可以减少不确定性，所以他们取决于资产的绩效。 本文分析了两种可供选择的有支出。第一，买家可以通过用股票支付与被并购方同时分担并购风险，因为这样可以使并购方和被并购方在并购活动中保持同等风险地位。第二，企业可以对所并购的资产进行分期付款（Kohers和Ang，2000）。买家和卖家可以在一个合资企业（JV）中将资产运作联合在一起，以提高资产信息交流的质量。Nand
27、a和Williamson (1995)描述被看作是一种机制的合资企业有利于交流信息直至最终并购购。例子中，Mantecon和Chatfield（2007年）发现，国内主要的合资企业，合资公司可以作为一种转移资产估值存在的不确定性。本文的目的是要了解哪些机制可以减少不确定性从而使得更为有利地行并购境外合资企业。本人假设，当投资更有价值的不确定性更加严重这种使用分期付款和股票作为支付方式和公平形成的合资企业投资应该是有利于收购，文章从1985年到2005宣布收购的30783个样本示例有助于现有文献的检验这一假说。这个样本的收购方来自75个国家，涉及6824个跨境的资产收购的来自128个国家。研究结
28、果表明，并购活动中的估值影响取决于对获得的信息资产收购前。并购方在该合资企业经营资产中取得了巨大的收益，这表明并购双方在共同获得信息去经营资产的并购中获利。笔者认为，这些成果应积极地与不确定性得到解决的程度联系起来。根据这一假说，在合资企业中取得较大收益的并购方所在的国家拥有较高水平的投资风险和更高水平的估值不确定性。这些结果表明，合资企业可以作为一个减少与跨界在严重的估值和收购国家的投资风险不确定性的过渡性使用机制。改善投资机制跨境风险。虽然估值对跨国并购者的影响的证据仍没有定论，但是这使买家面对更高水平的不确定性。原因有以下几个：尽职调查过程由于不同的会计和信息披露要求而变得复杂；资产同化
29、也由于决定企业如何经营的文化差异而变得更加困难； 此外，对少数股东不同级别的保护法律制度和强制合同执行都增加了未来现金流量的难度值。并购者如何才能减少与跨境相关的不确定性收购？ Reuer（2005）建议使用的分期付款和业务关系。作为货币使用的股票可以是一个合同工具来降低投资风险，因为它有一个分期定价效应（Hansen，1987）。目标公司如果接受股票，并购者和被并购的资产表示看好。并购者则相反，如果并购者选择用股票收购说明他们高估了被收购企业及其资产（迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫，1984）。因此，最终的市场反应对并购中股票支付的使用取决于并购方和目标并购企业的信息不对称程度以及作为其相对的议价地位。收
30、购公司也可以通过使用分期付款来减少并购价格的不确定性。Reuer等发现，在1995-1998年期间的3098个样本中，美国企业在购买高科技资产和服务性领域的交易时更多使用分期付款。 Kohers 和Ang（2000）分析938个并购使用分期付款。他们认为，分期付款为交易信息中存在较大不对称性提供了便利。 并购者跨国的并购中面对着更高水平的不确定性。本文通过分析现存的128个国家的资产跨国并购样本文献有助于并购者可以使用不同的机制，减少投资的不确定性。从这一分析的结果表明，当并购资产均位于在不同的国家时候，并购者获得较少的收益。研究结果表明，可以由跨国并购的并购者中存在的较严重的代理问题来解释这些偏低的收益。结果表明，在跨国并购中获取较大收益的并购是在一个共同经营资产收购的合资企业中的。这些较大收益的收购不能被解释为是受上市的影响，或者由于合营企业合同中嵌入看涨期权的存在，或通过对目标公司小股东的剥夺。该研究结果显示，分期付款与国内并购的较大收获有直接关系，但没有迹象表明在跨国并购中并购者受益于这些策略。结果表明，在合资企业所发生的信息交流提高了跨国并购交易的价值，通过存在着的较高的不确定性、估值水平和国家投资风险体现出来。因此，合资企业是一个降低跨境并购所固有风险的有效机制。作者：托马斯.曼特肯国籍：美国出处：银行和金融期刊，2009(33),640-641,650.