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1、 股权再融资论文：后股权分置时代上市公司在股权再融资活动中的股价操纵行为研究【中文摘要】再融资活动是证券市场的重要组成部分,其运作的效率直接关系到证券市场的成功与否。然而由于我国的特殊经济制度和经济背景与资本主义国家有巨大差异,因此诞生之初就存在众多制度安排不合理之处。最终导致我国股市再融资运作效率低下,股价操纵行为极其严重,严重扰乱了我国的资本市场的经济秩序。经济活动的基础是经济制度,股市同样如此。股市中的股价操纵行为严重削弱了证券市场运作赖以生存的经济制度基础,只有从制度层面研究我国的股市,才能从根源上解决我国股市再融资活动中的股价操纵行为。在现有文献资料的基础上,本文重点运用制度经济学和
2、寻租理论以及结合信息不对称理论和投资者行为偏差理论对后股权分置时代我国股市再融资活动中股价操纵行为进行研究。本文以2005至2008年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,主要选取市场化指数、信息有效性、股权结构、股本规模以及换手率和户均持股数等指标对再融资活动中股价操纵行为分类别进行配股和增发的实证研究发现：(1)从本文选择的事件窗口的累计超额收益率来看,增发活动的累计超额收益率远远超过配股活动的累计超额收益率,而且两者都为正超额收益率。(2)股价操纵程度与信息对称性呈显著的负相关性,说明操纵者利用信息不对称对股价进行操纵,等待利好消息发布后,获利出逃。另外,从两者的公告效应可以看出,两种再融资活动明
3、显存在信息提前泄漏的迹象。(3)流通盘比例与股价操纵呈现明显的负相关关系,而流通股大小与股价操纵呈现显著地正相关关系,这说明后股改时代中小投资者“用脚投票”的权利获得提升,而股价操纵的流通盘有扩大的可能,因为股改后大股东对二级市场和上市公司达到双重控制成为可能。(4)户均持股数与股价操纵呈现显著的正相关关系,换手率与股价操纵也有明显的正相关关系。说明任何的操纵必然会导致流通股份向操纵者账户流动的趋向,而且还伴随有换手率的急剧上升,这也为监管层控制操纵现象提供了参考。(5)市场化进程与股价操纵呈现明显的负相关关系,股权集中程度与股价操纵呈正相关关系,这说明完善的竞争市场是一种有效的外部公司治理机
4、制,能够有效的约束所有权与控制权分离所引起的管理者代理行为,对大股东获取私有收益的行为也能够起到有效的约束作用,很好的抑制了操纵者在二级市场的股价操纵行为。从本文的结论可以看出,我国虽然进行了股权分置改革,但是再融资活动中大股东和中小股东之间的利益对立问题仍然没有得到完全解决,大股东依然可以通过自身的资金和信息优势剥削小股东。长期来看,股权分置改革之后公司治理结构发生变化,股权集中度越来越趋向于合理的范畴,大股东也更加愿意做大上市公司价值,各方面的监督约束也逐步到位。【英文摘要】Refinancing activity is an important part of the securitie
5、s market, the efficiency of its operation is directly related to the stock market success. However, due to Chinas special economic system and economic backgrounds with the capitalist countries have huge differences, so the beginning of the birth of a number of institutional arrangements in unreasona
6、ble. Eventually, it leads to the lowly operational efficiency of Chinas stock market to refinance and the extremely serious stock price manipulation, and leads to serious disruption of Chinas capital market economic order. The stock market is based on the economic system as so as economic activity.
7、Stock price manipulation in the stock market severely weakened the economic survival of the securities market operation system, and that only from a system level study of Chinas stock market, in order to address the root causes of Chinas stock market refinancing activities in the stock price manipul
8、ation.Based on the existing literature, this article focuses on the use of institutional economics and rent-seeking with asymmetric information theory and the theory of investor behavior deviation of split share structure after the era of re-financing activities in Chinas stock market stock price ma
9、nipulation behavior. This article is selected from 2005 to 2008 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, and select market index, information efficiency, equity structure, capital stock turnover and the average number of holdings and other indicators and analogy with the additional
10、 empirical research the stock price of re-financing activities manipulation sub-categories of placements found that:(1) from this choice of event window the cumulative excess returns of view, the cumulative excess rate of return of additional activities is far more than the cumulative rate of return
11、 of over-allotment activities, and those have a positive excess rate of return. (2) The degree of stock price manipulation showed a significant negative correlation with information symmetry indicating the manipulators use information asymmetry to manipulate stock prices, waiting for good news and t
12、he release of profit fled. In addition, from both the announcement effect can be seen that two kinds of re-financing activities, there is obviously a sign of leakage of information in advance. (3) LiuTongpan ratio and stock price manipulation showed significant negative correlation but the size of t
13、he outstanding shares of stock price manipulation showed significant positive correlation, indicating small stock investors the right of “vote with their feet,” is promoted in post-reform era, while LiuTongpan has manipulation of expansion possible, because the major shareholders after the share ref
14、orm achieve dual control possible on the secondary market and listed companies. (4) The number of holdings per household and stock price manipulation showed a significant positive correlation while turnover and stock price manipulation there was a marked positive correlation. There is a description
15、of any outstanding shares will inevitably lead to manipulation of accounts to manipulate the flow of trends, but also accompanied by a sharp rise in turnover, which also provide a reference for control the manipulation of the phenomenon to the regulators. (5) The market-oriented process and stock pr
16、ice manipulation showed significant negative correlation while there is a positive correlation between stock price manipulation and the degree of equity concentration, indicating perfect competitive market is an effective external corporate governance mechanisms. It can be effectively bound by the r
17、ight of ownership and control of caused by separation of manager agent behavior, also can play an effective role in the binding for large shareholders to obtain private gain behavior and suppression of the manipulator in the secondary market stock price manipulation. From the conclusions of this art
18、icle can be seen, even though China had split share structure reform, but the antagonism between a major shareholder and the interests of small shareholders in refinancing activities has still not been fully resolved, a major shareholder can still superiority exploit minority shareholders through it
19、s own funds and information.Through the long term, after the split share structure reform, the structure of corporate governance changes, equity degree of concentration tends to a more and more reasonable areas, large shareholders of listed companies are more willing to enlarge the value of company,
20、 and all aspects of supervision also gradually put in place.【关键词】股权再融资 股价操纵 寻租 股权分置改革【英文关键词】stock market refinancing stock price manipulation rent-seeking the share reform【目录】后股权分置时代上市公司在股权再融资活动中的股价操纵行为研究摘要5-6Abstract6-7第一章 导论10-191.1 选题背景与研究意义10-121.1.1 选题背景10-121.1.2 研究意义121.2 文献回顾与评述12-161.2.1 国外
21、文献回顾与评述12-151.2.2 国内文献回顾与评述15-161.3 研究目标、内容与论文框架16-181.3.1 研究目标16-171.3.2 研究内容171.3.3 论文框架17-181.4 研究方法与技术路线181.4.1 研究方法181.4.2 技术路线181.5 论文的特色创新18-19第二章 理论分析与研究假设19-282.1 相关概念界定19-202.1.1 股票价格操纵19-202.1.2 股权再融资202.2 股权再融资活动中股价操纵的埋论分析20-242.2.1 信息不对称理论分析20-212.2.2 寻租理论分析21-232.2.3 投资者行为偏差理论23-242.3
22、股权分置改革对股权再融资中股价操纵影响的研究假设24-272.3.1 后股权分置时代再融资活动与股价操纵24-252.3.2 后股权分置时代再融资活动中的股价操纵行为的影响因素25-272.4 小结27-28第三章 实证研究设计28-333.1 样本选取与数据来源283.2 模型设定与变量说明28-323.2.1 期望收益率的确定28-293.2.2 超额收益率和累计超额收益率的确定293.2.3 股改后再融资样本的多元回归模型29-303.2.4 模型中的变量说明30-323.3 小结32-33第四章 实证结果及其阐释33-484.1 后股权分置时代股权再融资活动的公告效应334.2 股改后
23、再融资活动超额收益走势分析33-374.2.1 增发活动走势分析33-354.2.2 配股活动走势分析35-374.3 股改后再融资样本与对照样本对比分析37-384.4 股改后再融资样本与庄股样本对比分析38-394.5 样本描述性统计分析结果及其阐释39-404.6 PEARSON相关系数分析40-414.7 股改前后股权再融资样本的多元线性回归结果及其阐释41-454.7.1 增发活动多元线性回归结果及其阐释41-444.7.2 配股活动多元线性回归结果及其阐释44-454.8 稳健性检验45-474.9 小结47-48第五章 总结与展望48-525.1 结论与政策建议48-505.1.1 结论485.1.2 政策建议48-505.2 研究局限性与后续研究展望50-525.2.1 研究局限性505.2.2 后续研究展望50-52参考文献52-55致谢55-56作者简介56-57导师评阅表57