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1、THE BCCI AFFAIREXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. BCCI CONSTITUTED INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIME ON A MASSIVE AND GLOBAL SCALE. BCCIs unique criminal structure - an elaborate corporate spider-web with BCCIs founder, Agha Hasan Abedi and his assistant, Swaleh Naqvi, in the middle - was an essential component of its
2、 spectacular growth, and a guarantee of its eventual collapse. The structure was conceived by Abedi and managed by Naqvi for the specific purpose of evading regulation or control by governments. It functioned to frustrate the full understanding of BCCIs operations by anyone. Unlike any ordinary bank
3、, BCCI was from its earliest days made up of multiplying layers of entities, related to one another through an impenetrable series of holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, banks-within-banks, insider dealings and nominee relationships. By fracturing corporate structure, record keeping, regula
4、tory review, and audits, the complex BCCI family of entities created by Abedi was able to evade ordinary legal restrictions on the movement of capital and goods as a matter of daily practice and routine. In creating BCCI as a vehicle fundamentally free of government control, Abedi developed in BCCI
5、an ideal mechanism for facilitating illicit activity by others, including such activity by officials of many of the governments whose laws BCCI was breaking. BCCIs criminality included fraud by BCCI and BCCI customers involving billions of dollars; money laundering in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the A
6、mericas; BCCIs bribery of officials in most of those locations; support of terrorism, arms trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technologies; management of prostitution; the commission and facilitation of income tax evasion, smuggling, and illegal immigration; illicit purchases of banks and real est
7、ate; and a panoply of financial crimes limited only by the imagination of its officers and customers. Among BCCIs principal mechanisms for committing crimes were its use of shell corporations and bank confidentiality and secrecy havens; layering of its corporate structure; its use of front-men and n
8、ominees, guarantees and buy-back arrangements; back-to-back financial documentation among BCCI controlled entities, kick-backs and bribes, the intimidation of witnesses, and the retention of well-placed insiders to discourage governmental action. 2. BCCI SYSTEMATICALLY BRIBED WORLD LEADERS AND POLIT
9、ICAL FIGURES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. BCCIs systematically relied on relationships with, and as necessary, payments to, prominent political figures in most of the 73 countries in which BCCI operated. BCCI records and testimony from former BCCI officials together document BCCIs systematic securing of Ce
10、ntral Bank deposits of Third World countries; its provision of favors to political figures; and its reliance on those figures to provide BCCI itself with favors in times of need. These relationships were systematically turned to BCCIs use to generate cash needed to prop up its books. BCCI would obta
11、in an important figures agreement to give BCCI deposits from a countrys Central Bank, exclusive handling of a countrys use of U.S. commodity credits, preferential treatment on the processing of money coming in and out of the country where monetary controls were in place, the right to own a bank, sec
12、retly if necessary, in countries where foreign banks were not legal, or other questionable means of securing assets or profits. In return, BCCI would pay bribes to the figure, or otherwise give him other things he wanted in a simple quid-pro-quo. The result was that BCCI had relationships that range
13、d from the questionable, to the improper, to the fully corrupt with officials from countries all over the world, including Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Colombia, the Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, the Ivory Coast, India, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, P
14、akistan, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 3. BCCI DEVELOPED A STRATEGY TO INFILTRATE THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM, WHICH IT SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED, DESPITE REGULATORY BARRIERS THAT WERE DESIGNED
15、TO KEEP IT OUT. In 1977, BCCI developed a plan to infiltrate the U.S. market through secretly purchasing U.S. banks while opening branch offices of BCCI throughout the U.S., and eventually merging the institutions. BCCI had significant difficulties implementing this strategy due to regulatory barrie
16、rs in the United States designed to insure accountability. Despite these barriers, which delayed BCCIs entry, BCCI was ultimately successful in acquiring four banks, operating in seven states and the District of Colombia, with no jurisdiction successfully preventing BCCI from infiltrating it. The te
17、chniques used by BCCI in the United States had been previously perfected by BCCI, and were used in BCCIs acquisitions of banks in a number of Third World countries and in Europe. These included purchasing banks through nominees, and arranging to have its activities shielded by prestigious lawyers, a
18、ccountants, and public relations firms on the one hand, and politically-well connected agents on the other. These techniques were essential to BCCIs success in the United States, because without them, BCCI would have been stopped by regulators from gaining an interest in any U.S. bank. As it was, re
19、gulatory suspicion towards BCCI required the bank to deceive regulators in collusion with nominees including the heads of state of several foreign emirates, key political and intelligence figures from the Middle East, and entities controlled by the most important bank and banker in the Middle East.
20、Equally important to BCCIs successful secret acquisitions of U.S. banks in the face of regulatory suspicion was its aggressive use of a series of prominent Americans, beginning with Bert Lance, and continuing with former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, former U.S. Senator Stuart Symington, well-co
21、nnected former federal bank regulators, and former and current local, state and federal legislators. Wittingly or not, these individuals provided essential assistance to BCCI through lending their names and their reputations to BCCI at critical moments. Thus, it was not merely BCCIs deceptions that
22、permitted it to infiltrate the United States and its banking system. Also essential were BCCIs use of political influence peddling and the revolving door in Washington. 4. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MISHANDLED ITS INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF BCCI, AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIE
23、S CONCERNING BCCI. Federal prosecutors in Tampa handling the 1988 drug money laundering indictment of BCCI failed to recognize the importance of information they received concerning BCCIs other crimes, including its apparent secret ownership of First American. As a result, they failed adequately to
24、investigate these allegations themselves, or to refer this portion of the case to the FBI and other agencies at the Justice Department who could have properly investigated the additional information. The Justice Department, along with the U.S. Customs Service and Treasury Departments, failed to prov
25、ide adequate support and assistance to investigators and prosecutors working on the case against BCCI in 1988 and 1989, contributing to conditions that ultimately caused the chief undercover agent who handled the sting against BCCI to quit Customs entirely. The January 1990 plea agreement between BC
26、CI and the U.S. Attorney in Tampa kept BCCI alive, and had the effect of discouraging BCCIs officials from telling the U.S. what they knew about BCCIs larger criminality, including its ownership of First American and other U.S. banks. The Justice Department essentially stopped investigating BCCI fol
27、lowing the plea agreement, until press accounts, Federal Reserve action, and the New York District Attorneys investigation in New York forced them into action in mid-1991. Justice Department personnel in Washington lobbied state regulators to keep BCCI open after the January 1990 plea agreement, fol
28、lowing lobbying of them by former Justice Department personnel now representing BCCI. Relations between main Justice in Washington and the U.S. Attorney for Miami, Dexter Lehtinen, broke down on BCCI-related prosecutions, and key actions on BCCI-related cases in Miami were, as a result, delayed for
29、months during 1991. Justice Department personnel in Washington, Miami, and Tampa actively obstructed and impeded Congressional attempts to investigate BCCI in 1990, and this practice continued to some extent until William P. Barr became Attorney General in late October, 1991. Justice Department pers
30、onnel in Washington, Miami and Tampa obstructed and impeded attempts by New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau to obtain critical information concerning BCCI in 1989, 1990, and 1991, and in one case, a federal prosecutor lied to Morgenthaus office concerning the existence of such material. Imp
31、ortant failures of cooperation continued to take place until William P. Barr became Attorney General in late October, 1991. Cooperation by the Justice Department with the Federal Reserve was very limited until after BCCIs global closure on July 5, 1991. Some public statements by the Justice Departme
32、nt concerning its handling of matters pertaining to BCCI were more cleverly crafted than true. 5. NEW YORK DISTRICT ATTORNEY MORGENTHAU NOT ONLY BROKE THE CASE ON BCCI, BUT INDIRECTLY BROUGHT ABOUT BCCIS GLOBAL CLOSURE. Acting on information provided him by the Subcommittee, New York District Attorn
33、ey Robert Morgenthau began an investigation in 1989 of BCCI which materially contributed to the chain of events that resulted in BCCIs closure. Questions asked by the District Attorney intensified the review of BCCIs activities by its auditors, Price Waterhouse, in England, and gave life to a moribu
34、nd Federal Reserve investigation of BCCIs secret ownership of First American. The District Attorneys criminal investigation was critical to stopping an intended reorganization of BCCI worked out through an agreement among the Bank of England, the government of Abu Dhabi, BCCIs auditors, Price Waterh
35、ouse, and BCCI itself, in which the nature and extent of BCCIs criminality would be suppressed, while Abu Dhabi would commit its financial resources to keep the bank going during a restructuring. By the late spring of 1991, the key obstacle to a successful restructuring of BCCI bankrolled up Abu Dha
36、bi was the possibility that the District Attorney of New York would indict. Such an indictment would have inevitably caused a swift and thoroughly justified an international run on BCCI by depositors all over the world. Instead, it was a substantial factor in the decision of the Bank of England to t
37、ake the information it had received from Price Waterhouse and rely on it to close BCCI. 6. BCCIS ACCOUNTANTS FAILED TO PROTECT BCCIS INNOCENT DEPOSITORS AND CREDITORS FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR PRACTICES AT THE BANK OF WHICH THE AUDITORS WERE AWARE FOR YEARS. BCCIs decision to divide its operatio
38、ns between two auditors, neither of whom had the right to audit all BCCI operations, was a significant mechanism by which BCCI was able to hide its frauds during its early years. For more than a decade, neither of BCCIs auditors objected to this practice. BCCI provided loans and financial benefits t
39、o some of its auditors, whose acceptance of these benefits creates an appearance of impropriety, based on the possibility that such benefits could in theory affect the independent judgment of the auditors involved. These benefits included loans to two Price Waterhouse partnerships in the Caribbean.
40、In addition, there are serious questions concerning the acceptance of payments and possibly housing from BCCI or its affiliates by Price Waterhouse partners in the Grand Caymans, and possible acceptance of sexual favors provided by BCCI officials to certain persons affiliated with the firm. Regardle
41、ss of BCCIs attempts to hide its frauds from its outside auditors, there were numerous warning bells visible to the auditors from the early years of the banks activities, and BCCIs auditors could have and should have done more to respond to them. By the end of 1987, given Price Waterhouse (UK)s know
42、ledge about the inadequacies of BCCIs records, it had ample reason to recognize that there could be no adequate basis for certifying that it had examined BCCIs books and records and that its picture of those records were indeed a true and fair view of BCCIs financial state of affairs. The certificat
43、ions by BCCIs auditors that its picture of BCCIs books were true and fair from December 31, 1987 forward, had the consequence of assisting BCCI in misleading depositors, regulators, investigators, and other financial institutions as to BCCIs true financial condition. Prior to 1990, Price Waterhouse
44、(UK) knew of gross irregularities in BCCIs handling of loans to CCAH/First American and was told of violations of U.S. banking laws by BCCI and its borrowers in connection with CCAH/First American, and failed to advise the partners of its U.S. affiliate or any U.S. regulator. There is no evidence th
45、at Price Waterhouse (UK) has to this day notified Price Waterhouse (US) of the extent of the problems it found at BCCI, or of BCCIs secret ownership of CCAH/First American. Given the lack of information provided Price Waterhouse (US) by its United Kingdom affiliate, the U.S. firm performed its audit
46、ing of BCCIs U.S. branches in a manner that was professional and diligent, albeit unilluminating concerning BCCIs true activities in the United States. Price Waterhouses certification of BCCIs books and records in April, 1990 was explicitly conditioned by Price Waterhouse (UK) on the proposition tha
47、t Abu Dhabi would bail BCCI out of its financial losses, and that the Bank of England, Abu Dhabi and BCCI would work with the auditors to restructure the bank and avoid its collapse. Price Waterhouse would not have made the certification but for the assurances it received from the Bank of England th
48、at its continued certification of BCCIs books was appropriate, and indeed, necessary for the banks survival. The April 1990 agreement among Price Waterhouse (UK), Abu Dhabi, BCCI, and the Bank of England described above, resulted in Price Waterhouse (UK) certifying the financial picture presented in
49、 its audit of BCCI as true and fair, with a single footnote material to the huge losses still to be dealt with, failed adequately to describe their serious nature. As a consequence, the certification was materially misleading to anyone who relied on it ignorant of the facts then mutually known to BCCI, Abu Dhabi, Price Waterhouse and the Bank of England. The decision by Abu Dhabi, Price Waterhouse (UK), BCCI and the Bank of England to reorganize BCCI over