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1、McKinsey Global Institute Global capital markets: Entering a new era September 2009 McKinsey Global Institute The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), established in 1990, is McKinsey National Bureau of Economic Research; Robert Shiller; McKinsey Global Institute analysis US financial assets as a % of G
2、DP 139 167 207 240 417 442 392 Equity Private debt securities Government debt securities Deposits 194 101 198 p.p.1 93 p.p.1 18851900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020081890 After 1980, financial asset growth accelerated 1Percentage points of GDP. Mature financial markets may be headed for s
3、lower growth in the years to come. Private debt and equity are likely to grow more slowly as households and businesses reduce their debt burdens and as corporate earnings fall back to long- term trends. In contrast, large fiscal deficits in many mature markets will cause government debt to soar. For
4、 emerging markets, the current crisis is likely to be no more than a temporary interruption in their financial market development, since the underlying sources of growth remain strong. For investors and financial intermediaries alike, emerging markets will become more important as their share of glo
5、bal capital markets continues to expand. GLOBAL FINANCIAL ASSETS DECLINED BY $16 TRILLION IN 2008, THE LARGEST SETBACK ON RECORD For most of the first eight decades of the 20th century, financial assets grew at about the same pace as GDP. The exceptions were times of war, when government debt rose m
6、uch more rapidly. But after 1980, financial asset growth raced ahead. In the United States, for example, the total value of financial assets as a percentage of GDP has grown more than twice as much since 1980 as it had in the previous 80 years (Exhibit 1). Worldwide, equities and private debt accoun
7、ted for most of the increase in financial assets since 1980, as companies and financial institutions turned increasingly to capital markets for financing. By 2007, the total value of global financial assets reached a peak of $194 trillion, equal to 343 percent of GDP. 2 Exhibit 1 But the financial c
8、risis interrupted this process. The value of the worlds financial assets fell to $178 trillion by the end of 2008 (Exhibit 2). This 8 percent decline was the largest since our data series began in 1990, and in some countries, the drop was far worse. 2 Unless noted otherwise, all financial figures in
9、 this report are stated at 2008 exchange rates. This allows us to compare growth over time, excluding the effects of currency movements. Figures are not adjusted for inflation. Based on the latest available data, this report also updates figures published in our earlier reports. 0 50 100 150 200 250
10、 300 350 400 SOURCE: Federal Reserve; National Bureau of Economic Research; Robert Shiller; McKinsey Global Institute analysis US financial assets as a % of GDP 139 167 207 240 417 442 392 Equity Private debt securities Government debt securities Deposits 194 101 198 p.p.1 93 p.p.1 18851900191019201
11、930194019501960197019801990200020081890 After 1980, financial asset growth accelerated 1Percentage points of GDP. 9Global capital markets: Entering a new era McKinsey Global Institute Exhibit 2 The damage has been widespread, with financial assets declining in nearly every country (Exhibit 3). Only
12、a handful of economies, of which the United Kingdom is most notable, had a commensurate increase in 2008. The UK gain, however, was itself a by-product of the crisis: a UK government program to recapitalize troubled banks triggered a rise in private debt issuance that more than offset the decline in
13、 equities.3 Exhibit 3 3 The European Central Bank and the Bank of England announced in April 2008 they would accept securitized assets as collateral for repurchase agreements, or repos. This triggered a surge in securitization. Such repo market transactions with these two central banks accounted for
14、 more than 95 percent of all UK securitized asset issuance in 2008. 24 27 28 31 34 37 42 18 37 33 26 33 38 45 54 62 34 13 9 14 10 10 20022003 126 40 36 113 38 20 2001 114 22 18 2000 112 34 17 1995 70 25 1990 48 19 +9 178 194 2008 61 32 511 2007 56 29 481 2006 174 51 28 2005 155 46 27 2004 139 43 24
15、-82 Global financial assets fell by $16 trillion in 2008 21.2 227 37.042.3 282 48.6 305 52.3 320 38.5 303 39.9 297 45.5 298 56.8 334 60.7 343293 28.4 246 1Excludes debt write-downs of $0.28 trillion in 2007 and $0.98 trillion in 2008. 2 In current exchange rate terms the drop in global financial ass
16、ets would have been $22 trillion in 2008, or 11 percent of global financial assets. Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Global Financial Assets database; Bloomberg $ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years GDP $ Trillion Financial depth % of GDP Lar
17、gest declines in financial assets 2007-08 Hong Kong -0.6India -0.6France -0.6Switzerland -0.4Germany -0.3Canada -0.7 Russia-0.8 China-2.4 Japan-2.4 US-5.5 XX Compound annual growth rate 2000-07, % Global financial assets Equity securities Private debt securities Government debt securities Bank depos
18、its $ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years Financial assets decreased in all regions except the United Kingdom -9 -4 8 -6 -17 -40 -8 -64 -23 -9 -5.5 -1.6 0.6 -0.2 -2.4 -0.8 -2.4 -2.8 -0.6 -0.4 1Assets increase primarily due to an increase in international financial institution debt, ref
19、lecting a surge of securitization activity in response to the Bank of Englands accepting securitized assets as collateral for repurchase agreements. Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Global Financial Assets database Total financial assets per major region 4
20、.3 2.6 1.9 4.2 4.1 8.0 14.4 28.7 43.6 60.4 1.5 2.0 1.1 3.8 3.9 8.6 12.0 26.3 42.0 54.9 Eastern Europe Japan Eurozone US Latin America UK1 China Emerging Asia India Russia 2008 2007 Percent (%) Amount ($ Trillion) 10 Equities declined sharply Falling equities accounted for virtually all of the drop i
21、n global financial assets. The worlds equities lost almost half their value in 2008, declining by $28 trillion. The damage was widespread, with equity markets declining in every one of the 112 countries in our sample (Exhibit 4)producing the most severe crash since the Great Depression (Exhibit 5).
22、Markets have regained some ground in recent months, replacing $4.6 trillion in value between December 2008 and the end of July 2009. But as of August 31, 2009, the S Robert Shiller; McKinsey Global Institute analysis World War II Nov 1938 - Apr 1942 Great Depression Sep 1929 - Jun 1932 1973 oil cris
23、is Jan 1973 - Dec 1974 Subprime mortgage crisis Oct 9, 2007 - Mar 9, 2009 Black Monday Sept 1987 - June 1988 2000 dot-com bubble Oct 2000 - Feb 2003 S Haver Analytics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis Real house prices 1970 = 100 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360 390 420 450 Ireland Norway
24、 Switzerland Sweden Belgium Netherlands Australia Spain Canada Italy UK France Germany Japan USA 19702008200019901980 12 Exhibit B Private debt remained flat while government debt grew In contrast to the sharp decline in equities and real estate, the total value of all private debtincluding corporat
25、e bonds, financial institution bonds, and asset-backed securitiesrose to $51 trillion by the end of 2008. However, this apparent growth occurs because our database reports the face value of debt securities, not the market value. We estimate that applying current market valuations would reduce curren
26、t private debt outstanding by $2.4 trillion to $3.2 trillion, leaving its value roughly the same as a year earlier.5 Although corporate bond issuance reached a record $1.1 trillion in the first eight months of 2009, the issuance of asset-backed securities and financial institution debt far larger co
27、mponents of total private debt assetshas fallen sharply.6 Government debt also grew in 2008, rising 9 percent to $31.7 trillion. This growth was faster than its previous trend, and it will accelerate further in 2009 and 2010 as many countries boost borrowing to pay for planned fiscal stimulus spendi
28、ng. Given the decline in asset values and growth in debt, we see that leverage in the global economy has increased during the financial crisis rather than declined. This is true for many households, governments, banks, and some segments of the corporate sector. In aggregate, the global debt-to-equit
29、y ratio nearly doubled, jumping from 124 percent in 2007 to 244 percent by the end of 2008. This raises the vulnerability of the global economy to further shocks. It also indicates that the long process of deleveraging in the private sector has at best only just begun, and in the public sector has y
30、et to begin. Bank deposits reached $61 trillion in 2008 Global bank deposits7 grew by $5 trillion, or about 9 percent, in 2008 (Exhibit 6). Deposit growth accelerated in developed economies, reflecting both a flight to safety 5 This calculation is in line with other estimates. The Bank of Englands F
31、inancial Stability Report in June 2009, for instance, reported marked-to-market losses of $2.7 trillion on debt securities. 6 Even the rise in corporate bond issuance was a by-product of the crisis, occurring because other means of debt financing remained so hobbled. 7 Demand deposits, time deposits
32、, money market accounts, and currency. Global residential real estate values exceeded $90 trillion at their peak, but lost $3.4 trillion in value in 2008 SOURCE: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; Haver Analytics; McKinsey Global Institute Global residential real estate $ Trilli
33、on, using 2008 exchange rates for all years2 Western Europe1 US Japan Other 2008 87.4 36.9 27.1 9.3 14.0 07 90.8 38.6 30.2 9.5 12.6 06 88.3 36.4 31.8 9.6 10.6 05 82.3 33.4 31.0 9.6 8.3 04 74.5 30.5 26.9 9.8 7.3 03 67.4 27.3 23.6 10.2 6.2 02 62.1 24.7 21.2 10.8 5.4 01 56.9 22.1 19.4 11.5 3.8 2000 53.
34、9 20.6 17.5 12.3 3.6 99 50.6 19.1 15.6 12.9 3.1 98 48.3 17.7 14.4 13.3 2.9 97 46.5 16.7 13.4 13.7 2.7 96 45.2 16.1 12.8 13.9 2.5 1995 44.1 15.4 12.3 14.1 2.3 Compound annual growth rate, % 1996- 2007 2007- 08 7.7 19.8 -3.5 8.1 9.4 -3.7 11.5 -2.0 -10.0 -4.2 As a share of GDP, % 1851821821841851891972
35、05214224226218200189 ESTIMATE 1 Includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Data were not available for Ireland and Switzerland. 2 This data is presented in nominal terms. In real terms (as in exhibit A), the price declines in 2008 would be
36、greater Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. 13Global capital markets: Entering a new era McKinsey Global Institute by depositors and aggressive efforts by banks to attract deposits. Collectively, mature economy deposits grew by $2.8 trillion in 2008, reaching $45.3 trillion. These figures mar
37、ked a departure from recent trends, in which deposits in mature economies grew roughly in line with GDP. In the short term, higher growth in deposits may continue if investors remain risk averse and banks continue to compete aggressively for deposits . In emerging markets, deposits grew much faster,
38、 increasing by $2.1 trillion. However, they remain just one-quarter the size of deposits in mature economies. Exhibit 6 FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION WENT INTO REVERSE, WITH CAPITAL FLOWS FALLING BY 82 PERCENT One of the most striking consequences of the financial crisis was a steep drop-off in cross-bord
39、er capital flows, which include foreign direct investment (FDI), purchases and sales of foreign equities and debt securities, and cross-border lending and deposits. These capital flows fell 82 percent in 2008, to just $1.9 trillion from $10.5 trillion in 2007 (Exhibit 7). Relative to GDP, the 2008 l
40、evel of cross-border capital flows was the lowest since 1991. This created turmoil in the global banking system, causing severe liquidity crises and hurting borrowers dependent on foreign loans. It is unclear at this writing how quickly these flows will recover. Reversal of bank lending flows led th
41、e decline Capital flows not only fell, but most types went into reverse as investors, companies, and banks and other financial institutions sold foreign assets and brought their money back to their home countries. As in past financial crises, cross-border lending accounted for much of the overall de
42、cline.8 It fell from $4.9 trillion in 2007 to minus $1.3 trillion in 2008 (Exhibit 8). This indicates that lenders withdrew more cross-border loanscanceling or not renewing lines of credit, not rolling over loans, and so onthan they made. About 40 percent of this decline was due to the drying up of
43、interbank lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 8 In the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis, bank lending was also the most volatile type of capital flow. See Martin N. Baily, Diana Farrell, and Susan Lund, “The color of hot money,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000. Ban
44、k deposits increased in 2008, with mature economy deposits growing faster than historical average SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Cross-Border Investments database 4.5 8.7 10.4 12.3 14.3 4.4 6.8 7.6 8.7 9.7 2.2 0.7 2.6 1.9 50.7 10.3 10.8 11.4 2005 46.3 9.4 9.9 11.5 2000 34.0 7.0 6.9 11.2 11.5 24.7
45、 4.8 5.5 9.7 1990 19.0 4.2 4.1 8.0 2007 61.1 12.5 13.1 11.5 1995 56.1 11.6 12.1 20062008 Deposits as % of GDP 898792959710199 1 Compound annual growth rate. Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. 9.4 18.6 2.1 6.5 6.1 12.3 16.9 -0.5 8.3 8.3 CAGR1, % 1990-2007 2007-08 Global bank deposits $ Trilli
46、on, using 2008 exchange rates for all years Other mature countries Emerging countries Japan Eurozone United States 14 in September 2008. But the majority reflects the withdrawal of foreign lending to nonbank borrowers, particularly in emerging markets. In the worst-hit countries, foreign bank credit
47、 contracted by as much as 67 percent. Flows of foreign deposits also reversed course, as investors withdrew $400 billion of deposits from foreign financial centers in 2008. Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 This fall-off in cross-border lending flows during a recession fits the historical pattern, as we anticipat
48、ed in our report last year.9 Cross-border lending had experienced 9 Mapping global capital markets: Fifth annual report, p.12, McKinsey Global Institute, October 2008 (available at 198019851990199520002005 4 6 8 Total cross-border capital inflows $ Trillions, using 2008 exchange rates 2 12 10 0 1.0
49、 0.5 3.0 5.3 % of global GDP 4.54.53.66.53.711.9 Cross-border capital flows have reversed, falling by 82 percent 10.5 1.9 3.2 XX CAGR1 +15.0% SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Cross-Border Capital Flows database 1 Compound annual growth rate. +8.8% 2008 % of global GDP The fall in global capital flows in 2008 was driven by a decrease in bank lending SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute Cross-Border Capital Flows database 5.413.59.47.89.913.315.93.14.717.3 Total cross-border capital inflows1 $ Trillion, using 2008 exchange rates for all years 20.7 3.1 2