Institutional entrepreneurship as embedded agency An introduction to the special issue.doc

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1、INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS EMBEDDED AGENCY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE* We thank the many authors who submitted their articles to this special issue and the many reviewers who offered critical feedback in shaping the special issue throughout the process. Cynthia Hardy acknowledges f

2、inancial support from the Australian Research Council (Discovery funding scheme, project number DP 0771639). Steve Maguire acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada as well as from the Centre for Strategy Studies in Organizations in the Desaute

3、ls Faculty of Management at McGill University. Raghu GarudDepartment of Management and OrganizationThe Pennsylvania State University431 Business Building, State CollegePA 16802-3603, USAEmail: rgarudpsu.eduCynthia HardyDepartment of ManagementUniversity of MelbourneParkville, Victoria, Australia 301

4、0Email: chardyunimelb.edu.au Steve MaguireDesautels Faculty of ManagementMcGill University1001 Sherbrooke Street WestMontreal, Canada, H3A 1G5Email: steve.maguiremcgill.caWe are delighted to introduce this special issue of Organization Studies, the purpose of which is to develop a deeper understandi

5、ng of the concept of institutional entrepreneurship and to offer new avenues for future research. This concept has been attracting considerable attention in recent years, as was reflected in the record number of papers that were submitted the largest number that this journal has received for any of

6、its special issues to date. As a result, the selection process has been stringent and we are very pleased to present the eight articles in this special issue, all of which survived the demanding review process. Each of these articles contributes important insights to our understanding of institution

7、al entrepreneurship and, collectively, they provide an important benchmark for subsequent research on this phenomenon. In different ways, they explore how actors shape emerging institutions and transform existing ones despite the complexities and path dependences that are involved. In doing so, they

8、 shed considerable light on how institutional entrepreneurship processes shape or fail to shape the world in which we live and workThe term institutional entrepreneurship refers to the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to c

9、reate new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004: 657). The term is most closely associated with DiMaggio (1988: 14), who argued that “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that t

10、hey value highly”. These actors institutional entrepreneurs “create a whole new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together” (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Institutional entrepreneurship is therefore a concept that reintroduces agency, interests and p

11、ower into institutional analyses of organizations. It thus offers promise to researchers seeking to bridge what have come to be called the “old” and “new” institutionalisms in organizational analysis (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).We preface these papers with some of our ow

12、n observations on institutional entrepreneurship stemming from its paradoxical nature. Research on institutions has tended to emphasize how organizational processes are shaped by institutional forces that reinforce continuity and reward conformity. In contrast, the literature on entrepreneurship ten

13、ds to emphasize how organizational processes and institutions themselves are shaped by creative entrepreneurial forces that bring about change. The juxtaposition of these contradictory forces into a single concept generates a promising tension one that opens up avenues for inquiry into how processes

14、 associated with continuity and change unfold, and, how such unfolding processes can be influenced strategically. Accordingly, we first discuss the two core concepts underpinning the focus of this special issue, institutions and entrepreneurship, paying particular attention to how they emphasize asp

15、ects of social life that are seemingly at odds with one another. We then show how the apparent contradictions that arise when these concepts are combined into “institutional entrepreneurship” relate to the paradox of embedded agency. In one way or another, embedded agency preoccupies all our contrib

16、utors, as they seek to address the challenges of change in institutional fields. Finally, we conclude with an overview of the articles, drawing attention to how they deal with various aspects of the paradox.OVERVIEWOne way to understand the concept of institutional entrepreneurship is to review the

17、two different streams of literature that underpin it institutions and entrepreneurship. We therefore provide here an abbreviated description of these literatures one intended to be indicative rather than exhaustive in nature. InstitutionsInstitutions are commonly defined as “rules, norms, and belief

18、s that describe reality for the organization, explaining what is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999: 351). As taken-for-granted, culturally-embedded understandings, they specify and justify social arrangements and behaviors, both formal and informal. Institutions can

19、thus be usefully viewed as performance scripts that provide “stable designs for chronically repeated activity sequences,” deviations from which are counteracted by sanctions or are costly in some manner (Jepperson, 1991: 145). Organizations exist in an environment of institutions that exert some deg

20、ree of pressure on them; institutional environments are “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott, 1995:132). Institutions constrain behavior as a result of processes associated wit

21、h three institutional pillars: the regulative, which guides action through coercion and threat of formal sanction; the normative, which guides action through norms of acceptability, morality and ethics; and the cognitive, which guides action through the very categories and frames by which actors kno

22、w and interpret their world (Scott, 1995).Institutional arrangements are fundamental to understanding organization because of the ways in which they tend to be reproduced without much reflection in practice (Langer and Newman, 1979), become taken for granted (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), and create p

23、ath dependencies (David, 1985; Arthur, 1988). As a result, organizational scholars, whether adopting economic, sociological, or cognitive perspectives, have traditionally focused on the critical role that institutions play in providing continuity and stability in organizational processes. Among inst

24、itutional economists, for instance, the appearance and maintenance of institutional arrangements are explained in terms of economizing on transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). According to this perspective, institutional arrangements function to reduce uncertainty and to mitigate opport

25、unistic behavior such that transaction costs associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts between boundedly rational actors are reduced. Institutional arrangements, in turn, tend to reproduce rather than change existing social arrangements. Sociological perspectives on institution

26、al theory emphasize how institutional arrangements confer legitimacy, which is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). As a res

27、ult, some actions within a particular institutional field come to be seen as legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and may even be “prescribed”, making it difficult for actors to deviate from them.Literature on cognitive processes views actors as interpreters of ambiguous symbols and constructors of me

28、aning. Thus mutually understood schemas, mental models, frames, and rules of typification channel the sense-making activities of individuals, who are caught in webs of significance of their own making (Geertz, 1973). Actors engage in organizing as a “consensually validated grammar for reducing equiv

29、ocality by means of sensible interlocked behaviors,” thereby translating “ongoing interdependent actions into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes” (Weick, 1979: 3). With this view, institutions shared cognitive frames give meaning to inherently equivocal informational inputs by direct

30、ing sense making processes (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Moreover, the shared nature of these cognitive frames makes it difficult to stray far from them in either thought or deed.In sum, the institutional literature, whether it focuses on economics, sociology or cognition, has largely focused on ex

31、plaining the stability and persistence of institutions as well as isomorphic change in fields. More recently, however, there has been interest in how non-isomorphic change can be explained using an institutional lens (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002), as well as what is nature of the “institutiona

32、l work” needed to create, maintain, transform or disrupt institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Hardy and Maguire, 2007). Associated with this has also been a emphasis on processes of contestation and struggle within and over institutional fields (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Maguire and Hardy, 2006),

33、which are viewed as political arenas in which power relations are maintained or transformed (Clemens and Cook, 1999; Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003). Entrepreneurship To understand the critical role that entrepreneurship plays in the functioning of the modern economy, one need only refer to insights

34、offered by Schumpeter (1942) or Kirzner (1997). For Schumpeter, entrepreneurship is an engine of economic growth with the introduction of new technologies and the consequent potential for obsolescence serving to discipline firms in their struggle to survive perennial gales of creative destruction. T

35、he disruptions generated by creative destruction are exploited by individuals who are alert enough to exploit the opportunities that arise (Kirzner, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).From a sociological perspective, change associated with entrepreneurship implies deviations from some norm (Garud a

36、nd Karne, 2001). Consequently, it is unlikely that entrepreneurial outcomes and processes will be readily embraced by actors committed to existing ways of doing things in a particular field. To be successful, then, entrepreneurial efforts have to gain legitimacy, an undertaking that is made more dif

37、ficult as more social groups with heterogeneous interests are involved (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Indeed, as novel outcomes from entrepreneurial efforts spread, more diverse social groups will be affected and possibly mobilized, and, in the process, new legitimacy battles w

38、ill be spawned. Lachmanns work (e.g. 1986) highlights the active creation rather than the mere discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities, and it is here that literature from cognitive psychology sheds light. Cognitive psychology notes that the genesis of novelty is frequently driven by “bisociation

39、”, the intermingling of seemingly unrelated ideas from different knowledge domains (Koestler, 1964), and is facilitated by metaphors and analogies (Gentner, 1989, Tsoukas, 1991). Indeed, just as new technological artifacts may emerge from recombination of material resources, new insights may also em

40、erge from recombination of intellectual resources, a process in which outcomes are indeterminate (Usher, 1954). As products of recombination, new ideas have to overcome problems of legitimacy that arise when categories are crossed (Zuckerman, 1999). Common to all these perspectives on entrepreneursh

41、ip is an appreciation that the emergence of novelty is not an easy or predictable process as it is ripe with politics and ongoing negotiation. What may appear to be new and valuable to one social group may seem threatening to another. Thus, as with institutional theory, the literature on entrepreneu

42、rship has also had to come to grips with issues of agency, interests and power, but it has approached these from the perspective of change rather than continuity. Institutions and entrepreneurshipWork on institutions has, then, traditionally focused on continuity although it increasingly acknowledge

43、s the importance of change. In contrast, the work on entrepreneurship has focused on change even as it acknowledges that change is difficult to accomplish. The juxtaposing of institutional and entrepreneurial forces into a single concept, institutional entrepreneurship, thus offers considerable prom

44、ise for understanding how and why certain novel organizing solutions new practices or new organizational forms, for example come into existence and become well established over time.Separately, each body of literature faces the limitations associated with the longstanding “structure-agency” debate.

45、Privileging structure over agency leads to causally deterministic models wherein some features of the social world become reified and “structure” others, voiding agency and creativity from humans, which in the extreme are assumed to be automaton-like processors of objective information rather than i

46、nterpreters of intrinsically ambiguous symbolic inputs. In assuming that structures frustrate and, in the extreme, render agency by individual actors impossible, this work explains stasis and continuity; but it is less equipped to deal with change. Theories that privilege agency, on the other hand,

47、often promote heroic models of actors and have been criticized for being ahistorical, decontextualized and universalistic. Moreover, by emphasizing intentionality, such theories give little attention to unintended consequences of action, which are important components of the reproduction of institut

48、ions. Researchers from a wide range of disciplines have attempted to address these issues by offering theoretical perspectives that combine structure and agency in some form of mutuality constitutive duality. Giddenss (1984) work on “structuration” and Bourdieus (1977) notion of “habitus” are, perha

49、ps, the most well known (for a discussion, see Mutch 2007 in this issue). According to these researchers, structure is both the medium and outcome of social practices: instead of being in opposition, structure and agency presuppose each other and are mutually constitutive (Sewell, 1992). THE PARADOX OF EMBEDDED AGENCYWithin institutional theory, this broader structure-agency debate is often referred to the paradox of embedded agency (DiMaggio & Powel

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