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1、,a,*,c,a,b,c,Food Policy 24 (1999) 669683 Private incentives for adopting food safety and quality assurance,Erin Holleran, Maury E. Bredahl b, Lokman Zaibet,Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri, 200 Mumford Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, USA Center for International Trade Studies,
2、 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri, 200 Mumford Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, USA Department of Agricultural Economics, Sultan Qaboos University, Sultanate of Oman Abstract The competitiveness of food companies in national and international markets depends upon their ability t
3、o adopt production processes which meet food safety and quality requirements. Food safety and quality assurance affect the cost of carrying out transactions, and therein lies the private incentive for adopting voluntary quality assurance systems. While quality assurance systems have the potential to
4、 reduce transaction costs by serving as the sellers guarantee of safety or quality, they may also serve as trade barriers. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: ISO 9000; Transaction costs; Trade barriers; Quality system; Food safety Introduction Governments enact and administrat
5、ively determine ex ante national-level food legislation and technical requirements for food processing, handling and production processes, as well as ex post product liability law. These food safety technical requirements and liability laws are, of course, incentives for rms to adopt appropri- ate p
6、roduction processes and methods. In addition to the incentives driven by food and liability law, private incentives drive rms to move beyond adopting approved practices that meet technical requirements towards adopting quality assurance prac- * Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-573-882-2299; fax: +1-57
7、3-882-3958. E-mail address: holleranemissouri.edu (E. Holleran) 0306-9192/99/$ - see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 0 6 - 9 1 9 2 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 7 1 - 8,670,E. Holleran et al. / Food Policy 24 (1999) 669683,tices and systems, such as Total Quality Management,
8、ISO 9000, farm assurance systems and proprietary product quality systems. These quality assurance pro- grammes are designed to assure customers that agreed-upon (contractual) product characteristics and/or production processes are consistently delivered. Between con- tracting parties, sellers and bu
9、yers, technical requirements and contractual arrange- ments dene ex ante expectations and the quality assurance system assures ex post that agreed-upon characteristics and attributes are produced.,The philosophies underlying technical regulations and food law vary across coun- tries. In some countri
10、es the basis for technical regulations and food law is a negative list; products are generally regarded as safe, unless proved harmful and placed on a negative list. In other countries, a product cannot be sold unless it rst appears on the approved positive list. But, regardless of the variation in
11、the conceptual frame- work for food safety law, food quality and safety assurance can be based on similar norms and standards.,Transaction costs represent the framework to analyse the benets and costs of food quality standards. Transaction costs arise from uncertainty regarding food qual- ity attrib
12、utes and the costs vary depending on factors such as product differentiation and rm size. Higher transaction costs imply greater incentive to implement qual- ity systems.,Food safety and food quality assurance are forms of guarantees. Safety is dened as the condition of being safe from undergoing or
13、 causing hurt, injury or loss (Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1990). The assurance of food safety is a guarantee that the food is safe from causing harm. Quality, on the other hand, is not an absolute and is dened as meeting agreed-upon requirements. The assurance of quality is a guarante
14、e that agreed-upon specications have been met. If safety- related specications are included in the quality assurance system, then the assurance of quality encompasses safety. Quality and safety attributes in foodstuffs can be difcult to identify and observe. Akerloff argued that information asymmetr
15、y between buyers and sellers complicates the buyers problem of identifying quality, asserting that guarantees in an institutional form (e.g., quality assurance standards) were necessary to counteract the effects of quality identication and uncertainty (Akerloff, 1970). The papers rst section identie
16、s and discusses the characteristics of several food quality assurance systems.,The contractual denition of quality focuses on the transaction between the buyer and the seller. Quality and food safety assurance affect the cost of carrying out transactions, and therein lies the private incentive for a
17、dopting voluntary food quality assurance programmes. Transaction costs are the costs of undertaking an exchange between buyers and sellers, including the monitoring and enforcement costs. Such costs are directly affected by, and may often be increased by, food safety regulations, product liability l
18、aw and customer requirements. Quality assurance systems, such as the ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Standards, can mitigate transaction costs in several ways that are discussed in the second section of this paper. Quality assurance systems can directly affect the costs, prices and prots of rms, serving
19、as a private incentive for adopting a quality system. The second section discusses and illustrates transaction costs within the context of quality and food safety assurance.,671,E. Holleran et al. / Food Policy 24 (1999) 669683,The third section analyses the private, internal and external incentives
20、 for quality assurance system adoption. Internal incentives include the costs and benets directly associated with a rms operational processes affected by adoption. External incen- tives are related largely to the reduction of transaction costs. The paper concludes by drawing some implications for th
21、e economic performance of the food sector and for the impacts of quality assurance systems on international food trade.,Quality assurance systems,Quality assurance systems are designed to assure customers that contracted product characteristics and/or production processes are consistently delivered.
22、 They play an essential role in an exchange because food safety and quality attributes may not be directly observable.,Food safety and quality assurance systems can take many forms: (1) private volun- tary international quality assurance standards, such as ISO 9000; (2) national farm- level assuranc
23、e systems, such as Farm Assured British Pigs; and (3) proprietary quality assurance systems, such as those maintained by the large retail food chains in the United Kingdom (UK). Albeit with differing origins, quality assurance systems share two common features: (1) a reliance on documentation of pro
24、duction processes and practices and (2) third-party auditing and certication.,Private voluntary international standards,Voluntary quality assurance standards, such as ISO 9000, are internationally accepted procedures and guides initiated in order to maintain consistent quality (Zaibet, 1995). ISO 90
25、00 certication ensures a consistent production process. “The output of an ISO 9000 certied company reects the standards that have been set within that company ISO 9000 denes a quality framework within which a certi- ed company operates” (Stringer, 1994, p. 478). The ISO 9000 standards comprise three
26、 basic standards. ISO 9001, the most comprehensive, encompasses design, development, production, installation and servicing. ISO 9002 guides the develop- ment of a quality management system when design control is not a requirement. ISO 9003, the least comprehensive, addresses only nal inspection and
27、 testing. In all cases, ISO 9000 certication requires a third-party audit. The auditing agency evalu- ates the integrity of the documented production process by reviewing the quality system in practice.,Attaining ISO 9000 certication can benet a rm internally because the docu- mentation of productio
28、n processes can tighten production and management practices, thereby reducing cost and inefciency. Additionally, certication communicates to external parties that a rm has a documented quality management system in place, and in this way can affect transaction costs such as search costs. Mazzocco not
29、es “the certication mechanism lowers search costs for purchasing materials and ser- vices as well as lowering marketing/sales costs in communicating the nature of the quality management system in place” (Mazzocco, 1996, p. 771). Certication miti-,672,E. Holleran et al. / Food Policy 24 (1999) 669683
30、,gates some of the hazards of an exchange by guaranteeing the consistency of the production process and may play an important role in a due diligence legal defence. Legally, due diligence is a relative term which “means doing everything reasonable, but not everything possible” (Words and Phrases, 19
31、65, p. 141).,National assurance systems,A host of national quality assurance systems have become increasingly popular in the European Union (EU) following the linkage of Mad Cow disease to the human variant of the disease. In contrast to ISO 9000 and other rm-specic quality and safety assurance syst
32、ems, national assurance systems assure consumers that the pro- ducts of a nations farms are produced in a prescribed manner. Often these systems prescribe production practices from the farm level to the retail level, including trans- portation and storage. In common with other quality and food safet
33、y assurance sys- tems, these systems require a third-party audit for certication and continued com- pliance with the system.,At the margin, systems vary across countries, but most are intended to provide traceability of a raw input from the farm to processing and retail level. Information about the
34、quality assurance system ows through to the nal consumer in the form of a label. All national, farm-level systems allow product packages to bear a national label, thereby assuring consumers that the product was produced in that nation. Beyond that common element, the production and processing practi
35、ces reect national norms and cultures. For example, the strength of the concern for animal welfare interests in the UK is reected in the production practices allowed at the farm and processing level. The Farm Assured British Pigs system species practices leading to the humane treatment of animals at
36、 all levels of the supply chain. Like voluntary international quality assurance systems, national farm assurance systems communicate information about the consistency of production practices. Transaction costs are often reduced since buyers do not need to audit production practices of suppliers as o
37、ften, if at all. In some instances, buyers restrict approved suppliers to those certicated to a national quality assurance system.,Proprietary systems,Proprietary quality assurance systems, such as the national retailer quality assur- ance systems in the UK, specify retailers unique safety and quali
38、ty requirements. Five national retailers dominate the UK market, competing on the basis of product differentiation. UK retailers provide customers with branded products, as well as own label products that carry the retailers name or the retailers unique brand. Retailers promote customer loyalty thro
39、ugh own-label products, which represent 30% to 100% of the UK retailers stock. “Sainsbury a UK retailer brands are trusted by consumers and generate signicant levels of brand loyalty” (Cotterill, 1997, p. 125). Thus, proprietary systems, in common with the national farm-level assurance systems, impa
40、rt quality system information with the nal consumer in the form of a product label. And, labels are a key source of information for consumers.,673,E. Holleran et al. / Food Policy 24 (1999) 669683,UK retailers work closely with their suppliers to monitor and ensure contract speci- cation compliance.
41、 Retailers only purchase from a list of approved suppliers that adhere to their specic, supplier retailer quality assurance systems (RQAs). Not only does the use of supplier lists reduce supplier search costs, but the approved supplier lists and requirements of the proprietary quality systems are im
42、portant elements of meeting legal requirements of food safety law.,Sainsbury, Tesco and other UK retailers want to ensure that their supplies consist- ently meet product specications since the integrity of the supplies is a fundamental part of a due diligence defence in the UK. Under the UKs 1990 Fo
43、od Safety Act (FSA), “buyers must now show that they have exercised due diligence been proac- tive in ensuring that not only the food they handle directly but also the food they receive from suppliers conforms to the provisions of the” FSA (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992, p. 577). Given that retailers outsour
44、ce many of their ingredients and products, they are vulnerable to opportunism inherent in rms that rely on outsourcing. The RQAs establish a standard to facilitate buyerseller exchanges and to mitigate food safety concerns. The RQAs are a form of guarantee that agreed-upon requirements have been met
45、.,From a UK perspective, the RQAs are designed to ensure a consistent quality of supplies and to provide traceability. Many of the British RQAs, such as Sainsburys Product Management System, closely resemble the elements of ISO 9000. In prac- tice, the RQAs shift some of the food safety costs away f
46、rom the retailers to the suppliers. For example, Sainsburys RQA requires regular audits, self-audits, labora- tory testing, personal hygiene and foreign-body management, among others. All of these requirements have costs associated with them.,UK retailers have acquired signicant market power relativ
47、e to retailers in other EU countries and in the United States (US). Because of the UK retailers market power, RQAs become, in effect, standard business practice for suppliers. A quality system, such as an RQA, becomes standard business practice when most rms in a concentrated buying sector require t
48、he system.,Role in mitigating costs,Adoption of the various quality assurance systems can play a role in mitigating costs in the food chain. In the short run, rms incur sunk costs (e.g., start-up costs) related to adoption of the quality system. These sunk costs will, of course, vary depending on rm
49、 size, product type and existing quality system. There is also an apparent desire to shift the costs of quality control to others in the chain. For example, customers (e.g., UK retailers) shift some of the costs of quality assurance on to their suppliers by requiring them to have a particular qualit
50、y system certication. By shift- ing their costs, the customers expect to experience a decline in costs.,When a supplier adopts a particular quality system because of a customer require- ment, the expectation is that the action will result in improved market access. At the same time, costs may also d