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1、战略性贸易政策理论研究最新进展（The latest development of strategic trade policy theory）The latest development of strategic trade policy theory2008-7-21 15:55, Xu Lihua, Feng ZongxianSince 1980s, international economist analyzing method for the study of international trade policy has undergone great changes, there
2、are three main reasons: first, change the role of trade in the U.S. economy and the U.S. role in the world economy; change characteristics of second trade itself, affect the relationship between the United States and other countries; third economics changing views, especially the analysis of the ind
3、ustrial structure and the impact of competition with trade policy economists viewpoint. The traditional trade theory based on perfect competition can not explain the new phenomena in the field of international trade, such as intra industry trade, research and development, and the external economic p
4、roblems. The new trade theory explains these problems by introducing imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, and provides the appropriate reasons for government intervention in the field of international trade. American economist Krugman (1953-), as the representative of the internati
5、onal trade theory, the formation of long-term thinking to break the traditional emphasis on international economy, ignored by traditional trade theory of the two characteristics of economies of scale and imperfect competition, put forward the new theory of international trade.The new trade theory is
6、 often referred to as the name of strategic trade policy because the trade theory is a direct indication of its policy views. The basic content of the strategic trade policy mainly includes: Strategic export policy, strategic import policy and export protection policy. Think of these basic theories,
7、 in the imperfect competition and scale economy, the government can rely on production and export subsidies, research and development subsidies, import tariffs and protect the domestic market and other means to support the national strategic industry development, cultivate and enhance its competitiv
8、eness in the international market and obtain scale economic benefits, and the opportunity to compete for competitors market share and profit.I. expansion of the basic model of strategic trade policyStrategic trade policy has attracted much attention since its inception, and many scholars have extend
9、ed and questioned its basic model and basic views.Bagwell (1992) and Staigen (1994) to reduce the product cost uncertainty into the Spencer-Brander subsidy model, proved the optimality strategy variables independent R & D subsidies and product market competition selection. In the basic model, the go
10、vernment is assumed to act before the enterprise decision. Carnmichael (1987) consider the opposite situation, he assumed that domestic and foreign firms sell differentiated products oligopoly in third markets, Bertrand (price) competition among enterprises, and make the price before the government
11、decided to subsidies or tax. The results show that the timing of decisions has an impact on the governments eventual subsidy or tax and national welfare. Brander and Spencer (1985) were investigated at the same time give their export enterprises subsidies of the two governments, the result is simila
12、r to the prisoners dilemma, which both countries want to increase their welfare through subsidies, and the final result is both countries than without subsidies of evil. This study shows that the strategic trade policy is a beggar thy neighbour policies, easily lead to trade disputes of trade betwee
13、n the two sides.Some scholars have investigated the relationship between cost, industrial concentration and strategic trade policy. Canada Ngo Van Longa and An-toine Soubeyrar (1997) believes in export subsidies in Cournot competition can improve national welfare, but if domestic firms relative to f
14、oreign factory number enough, enough domestic demand curve convex, then the optimal policy is the national export tax.Strategic trade policies were developed in developed countries, and some scholars made a new approach to the applicability of the theory to developing countries. Scholars represented
15、 by Carlos (late) argue that strategic trade policy is suitable for developing countries. Another view is that strategic trade policy is not suitable for developing countries. In addition, scholars have discussed the relationship between strategic subsidies and corporate profits, consumer surplus an
16、d national welfare, as well as the relationship between strategic trade policy and the scale of interests, Stack M Bergs competition, and so on. In a word, the expansion of the basic model and the basic theory of the strategic trade policy has greatly enriched the connotation of the theory.Two, the
17、latest research progress of strategic trade policy theory1. competitive advantage and strategic trade policyThe UKs David Colliea and David de Mezab (2003) in the competitive advantage of strategic trade policy in the chase extension of the famous Meza (1986), Neary (1994), and Bandyopadhyay (1997)
18、of the research results, and points out that Brander-Spencer (1985) model shows that,Low cost countries offer higher export subsidies / export taxes than the cost countries do.In the traditional trade model, free trade policy is the best in every country. But in the absence of retaliation, many coun
19、tries are keen to abandon free trade policy, which gives a reasonable explanation of the strategic trade policy. If there is an oligopoly, there will be rent, so it is in the interests of the state to create a biased competition environment. Since the governments motive is to transfer profits to dom
20、estic manufacturers, the subsidies allocated to the most profitable manufacturers are the highest, and the lower cost countries provide higher subsidies to their firms. Strategic complementarity means that when an enterprise cuts production, another enterprise does the same, resulting in higher pric
21、es and benefits. This shows that low-cost enterprises produce the largest output, so the government sets the highest export tax. The author believes that low-cost countries are more likely to profit from government intervention, and that whatever the governments policy is, the absolute value of low-
22、cost countries is greater than the cost of rival countries.2. income constraints, strategic trade policy and industrial policyThe strategic trade policy theory emphasizes the difference between the commitment ability of companies and the government, which is one of the key factors or motivations for
23、 interfering with the oligopoly market. Different scholars in the extension of the theory, although not only consider the industrial policy while also taking into account the trade policy, but are based on the assumption that no subsidies can raise local pass without distorting taxes, $1 of public f
24、unds the marginal social cost of 1. but in practice, raise subsidy distorts the the cost to the economy, which means that $1 of public funds the opportunity cost is greater than the to J. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy in Britain (2004) is considered a companys profit and social value of pre subsidy,
25、describes the situation of dynamic oligopoly competition under the trade and industrial policy, pointed out that in different circumstances, the fund the marginal social costs may be greater than 1 or less than 1., for example, when there are raised by twisting part caused by the loss of self equity
26、 subsidies or domestic companies All foreigners, the funds marginal social cost is greater than 1; and when the optimal profit of domestic companies have no income constraint conditions is not sufficient to attract foreign companies to enter the market, and there is no fixed cost of distorting subsi
27、dies do not exist, the fund will cost marginal agency is less than 1. J. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy (2004) investigated the presence and absence of strategic trade and industrial policy income constraints, points out that the optimal total net subsidy funds expenditure and the marginal social cost
28、 is compared with the changes in the reverse direction, when the marginal cost will rise when the agency funds, the total net decline in spending on subsidies is optimal.3., the substitution relation between strategic alliance and strategic trade policyGerman Karl Morasch (2000) investigates whether
29、 the loose competition policy can be used as an alternative to the strategic trade policy in the context of strategic alliances. The alliance is to build strategic contracts to change market output. Under the general conditions, the effect of the implementation of the strategic trade policy depends
30、on the following factors: domestic consumption share, the nature of competition in the product market, the initial number of manufacturers in the industry and the feasibility of the international union.Karl Morasch (2000) believes that if the International Union is viable, without considering the na
31、ture of competition in the product market, the alliance will be particularly good for low share domestic consumption, as well as for a few oligarchs. If the alliance enterprises can gain a strategic advantage over his competitors, the strategic alliance can play the same strategic trade policy, stra
32、tegic alliance is likely to replace the loose competition policy of strategic trade policy. The obvious advantages of strategic alliances loose competition policy is that the government does not require complete information about the structure or market enterprises grasp the cost management, but not
33、 easy to incur foreign retaliation, because compared with the subsidy policy of competition policy is not too interesting.As of now, discuss the strategic alliance in international competition effect is limited to oligopoly between competitors joint R & D spillovers effect on product market competit
34、ion and the impact on welfare is not their focus of discussion, Karl Morasch (2000) discuss the focal point lies in the welfare effects of firms and government strategic behavior. Considering the prisoners dilemma, Karl Morasch (2000) believes that it is more appropriate to establish a cooperative g
35、ame model of international policy. The model includes: the first stage of the strategic choice phase, the decision of the producing country to adopt the form of intervention, the strategic alliance, the strategic trade policy, or the non intervention. If a country adopts a positive intervention stra
36、tegy, in the second stage of the strategic action phase, the government will either set the scope of the tariff / subsidy or form a strategic alliance to construct a strategic cooperation contract. Third stage output stage,Enterprises compete in the product market. The end result depends on the degr
37、ee of strategic cooperation. If countries can cooperate in the first, second stage, they will choose the strategic trade policy and formulate the joint optimum tariff or subsidy range. Karl Morasch (2000) believes that cooperation is impossible at a strategic stage of operations, so the best is ofte
38、n not the case. Based on this consideration, Karl Morasch (2000) examines the effects of different decision stages on the latter two stages. Karl Morasch) (2000) comparing welfare with trade policy and non intervention under the situation of coalition structure, and we think that noninterference can
39、 not produce non cooperative game equilibrium in policy choice stage. If each countrys industry consists of more than two companies, the result of the prisoners dilemma is that each country will implement the Alliance Program, which is less than the welfare of the two governments when they adopt the
40、 strategic trade policy.The main conclusions of Karl Morasch (2000) are as follows: (1) as long as the export share is large enough, the strategic alliance strategy will exceed the strategic trade policy and bring greater welfare to the country. (2) the change in the nature of competition in the pro
41、duct market does not affect the relative effects of the alliance and the strategic trade policy. Compared with strategic alliances and strategic trade policies, the welfare effects of non intervention policies are worse, at least for countries with a relatively low share of domestic consumption. (3)
42、 when China does not consume the product, the implementation of the strategic trade policy is usually better than the strategic alliance. (4) as long as other countries choose not to interfere, the strategic alliance usually leads to lower welfare than the strategic trade policy in the countries whe
43、re the active intervention policies are implemented.4. strategic trade policy and economic growthThe United States, Xinshen, Diao and Terry, Roe, and Turkey Erinc Yeldan (1999) constructed a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth caused by R&D (its first model was established by Romer in 199
44、0). The model detailed and calibrated data from Japan, obtained transition states as well as equilibrium equilibria, and studied the effects of trade facilitation and R&D promotion policies on long-term economic growth and social welfare. The author finds that although trade liberalization promotes
45、welfare in the short run, it will lead to a decline in growth rates and a loss of social welfare in the long run. Study on the model results show that when the effect of strategic trade policy on domestic R&D redistribution of resources is very small, the cross-border technology knowledge spillover
46、has played an important role, in turn, such an important role to further stimulate the economic growth.5 strategic trade and commission competitionThe United States Nolan H. Miller and Amit Pazgal (2005) application of duopoly theory results, put forward the choice of government subsidies, all peopl
47、e choose managers incentive mechanism and the managers in the three stage of the game product market competition, that if all people have full power to control the behavior of managers, so that the optimal strategy doesnt depend on trade policy in the product market competition pattern, for example,
48、 whether the price or output competition.Nolan, H., Miller, and Amit Pazgal (2005) apply the strategy of everyone and managers in the two phase duopoly game in the industrial organization literature to the discussion of commission competition in the strategic trade problem. The author constructs a t
49、hree stage game, where the government provides subsidies, the owner designs incentives, and the managers compete in third countries. The author believes that once considered relationship between the owner and the manager of the optimal trade policy is only determined by the factors such as cost, demand function, if all people have enough motivation to control its managers rights, so that the optimal balance of trade / interference will not depend on the nature of the pr